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  INTRODUCTION   
Individuals do not always respond to regulation as Homo 
economicus, and administrative agencies have finally begun to 
notice.1 The fact that individuals deviate in predictable ways 
from neoclassical assumptions of rationality has been widely 
recognized in the academic literature and has become well 
known to the public.2 But only recently has it begun to shape 
regulatory policy.3 Agencies have begun to develop regulations 
 
 1. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 6 (2008). 
 2. See, e.g., DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL, at xx (2008); Chris-
tine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. 
REV. 1471, 1471 (1998); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, 
and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 341 (1984); Matthew Rabin, Psychol-
ogy and Economics, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 11, 11 (1998).  
 3. For recent accounts in popular literature, see Dan Charles, Leaping 
the Efficiency Gap, 325 SCIENCE 804 (2009), and Michael Grunwald, How Oba-
ma Is Using the Science of Change, TIME, Apr.13, 2009, at 28. 
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and policies that reflect the insights of behavioral economics,4 
and the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) 
within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has intro-
duced behavioral economics to White House review of agency 
regulations.5 As a result, the influence of behavioral economics 
on agency decisionmaking is likely to grow substantially. Regu-
lation has entered the behavioral era. 
Although behavioral research is often referred to as “beha-
vioral economics,” economists are not the only sources of in-
sight for making regulation sensitive to the ways in which indi-
viduals depart from the traditional rational-actor model. 
Somewhat overshadowed in the public and policymaking world 
are the important insights of other fields within the behavioral 
and social sciences. These insights suggest, for example, that it 
may be as important for regulators to account for descriptive 
and prescriptive norms as for the insights of behavioral eco-
nomics, such as framing, hyperbolic discounting, loss aversion, 
and so on.6 Taken together, the behavioral and social sciences 
 
 4. See, e.g., Letter from Cass R. Sunstein, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regu-
latory Affairs, to the Honorable David Strickland, Adm’r, Nat’l Highway Traf-
fic Safety Admin. (Mar. 19, 2010), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/ 
postreview/Tire_Fuel_Efficiency_Consumer_Information_Final_Rule.pdf (en-
couraging the Agency to complete comprehensive studies that reflect prin-
ciples of behavioral economics, such as promoting easy comparison shopping). 
 5. See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, 2009 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF 
FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND 
TRIBAL ENTITIES 35 (2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/ 
files/omb/assets/legislative_reports/2009_final_BC_Report_01272010.pdf (“OMB 
recommends consideration of behaviorally informed approaches to regulation. 
Such approaches, rooted in several decades of work in social science, can serve 
to improve rules by incorporating insights that come from relaxing assump-
tions usually invoked in neoclassical economic theory. With an accurate un-
derstanding of human behavior, agencies would be in a position to suggest in-
novative, effective, and low-cost methods of achieving regulatory goals.”); see 
also Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory 
Affairs, to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies 1 (June 18, 2010) 
[hereinafter 2010 OIRA Disclosure Memo], available at http://www.whitehouse 
.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/inforeg/disclosure_principles.pdf (providing 
“guidance to inform the use of disclosure and simplification in the regulatory 
process”). 
 6. Behavioral economics incorporates many of cognitive psychology’s 
findings, and it has become common in the media to apply the term “behavior-
al economics” to the findings of several fields. See, e.g., Hunt Allcott & Sendhil 
Mullainathan, Behavior and Energy Policy, 327 SCIENCE 1204, 1204–05 
(2010); Grunwald, supra note 3, at 28. For widely read recent works in social 
psychology, see NOAH J. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., YES: 50 SCIENTIFICALLY PROVEN 
WAYS TO BE PERSUASIVE (2008); DOUGLAS MCKENZIE-MOHR & WILLIAM 
SMITH, FOSTERING SUSTAINABLE BEHAVIOR (1999). 
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suggest that a multitude of factors beyond price explain the va-
riability in human behavior, and understanding these factors 
can make regulation more effective.7 For simplicity, we refer in 
this Article to behavioral economics and the related behavioral 
and social sciences as “behavioral science,” although we note 
that the term as we refer to it includes a wide range of fields, 
such as sociology and social psychology, that are more common-
ly referred to as social science.8 
Behavioral insights are important at three critical stages 
in the regulatory process. First, they can help to improve the 
manner in which agencies develop regulatory options early on 
in the regulatory process.9 A quick illustration is helpful. Al-
though electric cars have the potential to reduce carbon- and 
other air-emissions, recent studies suggest that their impact 
and cost may vary dramatically based on whether drivers re-
charge their vehicles at peak or off-peak periods (e.g., when 
they arrive home from work, or in the middle of the night).10 
 
 7. See, e.g., W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK 153–59 (1992) (arguing that information about 
risk increases regulations’ effectiveness); John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert 
Wiener, Resolving Risk Tradeoffs, in RISK VERSUS RISK 226, 241–68 (John D. 
Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995) (describing regulatory efforts 
that take into account human behavior); Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and 
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059, 1077–88 (2000) (noting that 
one role of cost-benefit analysis is to correct for decisionmaking by policymak-
ers under pressure from non-rational public responses to risk). 
 8. We include a number of fields in the term “behavioral science.” See, 
e.g., GARY S. BECKER & KEVIN M. MURPHY, SOCIAL ECONOMICS (2000) (eco-
nomic sociology); GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 6 (social psychology); Kahne-
man & Tversky, supra note 2 (cognitive psychology); George Loewenstein et 
al., Neuroeconomics, 59 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 647 (2008) (neuroeconomics). 
 9. Section 6(a)(3)(C)(iii) of Executive Order 12,866 directs agencies to 
analyze “potentially effective and reasonably feasible alternatives to the 
planned regulation.” Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a)(3)(C)(iii), 3 C.F.R. 638, 645 
(1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006); see also Jonathan Baert Wiener, 
Mechanism Choice, in PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW (Daniel A. Farber & 
Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 30–31), availa-
ble at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1408163 (discussing 
the potential influence of behavioral insights on regulatory-instrument choice); 
2010 OIRA Disclosure Memo, supra note 5, at 3, 9 (identifying principles to 
assist agencies’ use of information disclosure, simplification, and default rules).  
 10. See discussion infra Part III.A. We use the term “electric cars” to refer 
to all personal light-duty vehicles that draw some or all of their energy from 
the electric grid, including plug-in hybrids as well as standard electric cars. 
The Department of Energy has included deployment of 500,000 plug-in hybrid 
electric vehicles per year by 2015 in its seven “high priority performance 
goals.” OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, 
FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 79 (2010) [hereinafter ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES], 
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Even though Congress has not passed a statute narrowing the 
options, the discussion of options already has begun to focus on 
approaches that reflect the traditional assumption that indi-
viduals respond in predictably rational ways to monetary in-
centives and technological fixes.11 If an agency focuses only on 
approaches for recharging electric cars based on the price of 
electricity or the development of new equipment, however, it 
may miss opportunities for greater emissions reductions at 
lower cost. For example, increasing electricity rates during 
peak periods may discourage peak-period recharging, but the 
magnitude of the price increase necessary to induce the desired 
level of off-peak recharging may generate consumer and politi-
cal backlash.12 By accounting for a more complete range of re-
sponses (e.g., the importance of cognitive costs, habits, and 
hyperbolic discounting), and by combining pricing strategies 
with behaviorally sensitive solutions (e.g., immediate feedback 
and normative messaging), an agency may be able to develop 
alternative or complementary regulatory strategies that are 
more effective, efficient, and politically viable. Pairing price-
and technology-based approaches with behavioral approaches 
also may produce synergistic gains.13 Billions of dollars—and 
millions of tons of carbon emissions—may be at stake. 
Second, behavioral science insights can add value when 
agencies subject their regulatory options to cost-benefit analy-
sis and when these cost-benefit analyses are subject to OIRA 
 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Analytical_Perspectives 
(click on “Performance & Management” hyperlink). 
 11. See discussion infra Part III.A; see also Thomas Webler & Seth P. Tu-
ler, Getting the Engineering Right Is Not Always Enough: Researching the 
Human Dimensions of the New Energy Technologies, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 2690, 
2691 (2010). 
 12. AHMAD FARUQUI & LISA WOOD, QUANTIFYING THE BENEFITS OF 
DYNAMIC PRICING IN THE MASS MARKET 30 (2008), available at http://www.eei 
.org/ourissues/electricitydistribution/Documents/quantifying_benefits_final.pdf 
(noting that the level of off-peak to on-peak price shift needed to induce a re-
duction in peak load demand is often higher than utilities are willing to im-
plement due to the fear of negative customer response).  
 13. Some evidence for this effect can be found in programs that have 
paired economic disincentives, such as taxes or fines, with public education 
campaigns that highlight the moral case for adoption of the target behavior. 
For example, a tax on plastic grocery bags in Ireland paired with an aggres-
sive media campaign led to a ninety-four percent drop in the use of plastic 
bags. Elisabeth Rosenthal, With Irish Tax, Plastic Bags Go the Way of the 
Snakes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2008, at A3, available at 2008 WL 1990925.  
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review.14 Cost-benefit analysis, which relies heavily on neoclas-
sical economics, was originally intended to reduce regulatory 
burdens by eliminating regulation with costs in excess of bene-
fits.15 But such analysis has attracted support from those who 
have found in it the potential not to eliminate regulation but to 
improve regulation, by making regulation work better for af-
fected parties.16 On this account, cost-benefit analysis focuses 
agency officials on accepted economic criteria for regulation, 
enabling regulators to resist their own narrow preferences or 
pressures from an irrational public. As Cass Sunstein has ar-
gued, one role of cost-benefit analysis—whether narrowly or 
broadly construed—is to provide the data necessary to serve as 
a counterweight to irrational perceptions of and responses to 
risk.17 But many have realized that cost-benefit analysis, what-
ever its theoretical advantages, cannot deliver in practice if it 
fails to correct for extra-rational responses to regulation. Be-
havioral insights are useful in this regard. 
Third, to the extent that behavioral remedies reduce the 
economic or political cost of a regulatory measure or increase 
its effectiveness, behavioral insights can affect not only the 
specific regulatory measure selected, but also the social goal 
that a regulatory action is designed to achieve. Lower regulato-
ry costs and greater effectiveness may allow regulators to 
achieve a more ambitious goal or may save resources for other 
social investments. In short, behavioral insights may not only 
affect development and review of particular regulations, but al-
so the selection and achievement of broader social goals. 
Although agencies and OIRA have come to recognize the 
potential of behavioral economics to respond to predictable de-
viations from traditional rationality assumptions,18 they lack a 
 
 14. See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a)(C)(iii), 3 C.F.R. at 646 (requiring that 
agencies “assess both the costs and the benefits of the intended regulation”).  
 15. NICK HANLEY & CLIVE L. SPASH, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS & THE 
ENVIRONMENT 4–6 (1993). 
 16. See Sunstein, supra note 7, at 1096. 
 17. See id. at 1077–88; see also ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 10, 
at 98 (“By drawing attention to the consequences of proposed courses of action, 
benefit-cost analysis can help the public to evaluate regulatory initiatives.”).  
 18. See, e.g., SOC’Y FOR RISK ANALYSIS, COMMITTEE OF PAST PRESIDENTS’ 
RECOMMENDATIONS TO OMB ON REGULATORY REVIEW 5 (2009), available at 
http://reginfo.gov/public/jsp/EO/fedRegReview/OIRA_EO_12866_revision_SRA_ 
comments.pdf (recommending that OIRA “[e]nhance the role of social and be-
havioral sciences, regarding how and why people (as individuals or groups) 
behave and decide in response to risks, opportunities, and uncertainty”); 2010 
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framework for incorporating these insights into regulatory 
analysis with anywhere near the rigor of traditional rational-
actor-based considerations. Behavioral research demonstrates 
the extent and limits of rational action, but it does not tell us 
how to consider what appear to be extra-rational tendencies 
(e.g., reliance on heuristics, framing effects, or motivational 
crowding) in regulatory analysis.19 Nor have legal scholars ar-
ticulated a framework for incorporating behavioral insights in-
to the regulatory process, despite excellent theoretical work in 
the area.20 
The purpose of this Article is to take an initial step toward 
developing such a framework. A framework will better enable 
agencies to apply behavioral analysis in a systematic and con-
crete fashion.21 In this way, it will better enable agencies to ap-
ply behavioral analysis in a manner sufficient to achieve its in-
tended results—that is, to prevent agencies from making 
irrational decisions, either because of their own misperceptions 
 
OIRA Disclosure Memo, supra note 5, at 3–12 (providing guidance to agencies 
on use of behavioral principles in the regulatory process). 
 19. There is an ongoing debate as to whether the empirical observations 
reviewed here represent actual departures from rationality or are simply the 
result of other factors that are consistent with a rational, utility-maximizing 
agent. See BOUNDED RATIONALITY 10 (Gerd Gigerenzer & Reinhard Selten 
eds., 2001); Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and 
the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1552 (1998). In this Article, we contrast em-
pirical findings from social and behavioral findings with the “thick” concep-
tions of rationality that have dominated, implicitly if not explicitly, much of 
the study of law and economics. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, 
Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law 
and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1066, 1070–73 (2000). We do not in-
tend to engage in the debate over the definition of rationality. Instead, we 
hope to offer a framework for incorporating a greater degree of behavioral 
realism (regardless of how labeled) into the process of regulatory development, 
review, and selection. For ease of discussion, we refer to this set of behavioral 
tendencies as “extra-rational behavior.” 
 20. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Bounded Rationality and Legal Scholar-
ship, in THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 137, 137 (Mark 
D. White ed., 2010) (identifying the need for legal scholars to account for 
bounded rationality in the development of legal prescriptions); Grant M. Hay-
den & Stephen E. Ellis, Law and Economics After Behavioral Economics, 55 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 629, 660–67 (2007) (proposing a behavioral framework that em-
phasizes the context of human action as an independent factor in the regulato-
ry process); Jolls et al., supra note 2, at 1476 (providing a framework for the 
use of behavioral economics research in law). 
 21. For a more general framework, see Jolls et al., supra note 2, at 1508–
45. For the classic example of the development and application of a rigorous 
framework for legal analysis, see Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, 
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 
85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1090–111 (1972). 
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or unanticipated responses from the public. In addition, such a 
framework will enable agencies to generate data about behav-
ioral effects and will reveal areas for further research. Behav-
ioral analysis is likely to develop incrementally. A framework 
will accelerate the pace of learning. 
Without a framework like that in question, agencies may 
not only miss an opportunity to use behavioral analysis to im-
prove the efficacy and efficiency of regulation, but they may use 
behavioral analysis in a way that actually decreases the effec-
tiveness of regulation. Important insights may simply be over-
looked in the thicket of published studies. As with traditional 
price-based mechanisms, behavioral measures may, at times, 
lead to counterproductive results, particularly when not im-
plemented properly.22 Or behavioral analysis may be used se-
lectively to support desired outcomes and ignored when con-
trary to desired outcomes.23 At the same time, it may be used 
without the necessary transparency to facilitate judicial review 
of regulation,24 or to promote congressional oversight.25 In this 
sense, it may decrease the accountability of regulation.26 At a 
 
 22. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, The Lulling Effect: The Impact of Child-
Resistant Packaging on Aspirin and Analgesic Ingestions, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 
324, 326–27 (1984) (documenting that the proportion of accidental aspirin in-
gestions from safety-capped bottles rose sharply after the introduction of child-
resistant bottle caps); W. Kip Viscusi & Gerald Cavallo, Safety Behavior and 
Consumer Responses to Cigarette Lighter Safety Mechanisms, 17 MANAGERIAL 
& DECISION ECON. 441, 456 (1996) (suggesting that regulators consider con-
sumer responses to product safety improvements and consider pairing tech-
nological approaches with hazard warnings and consumer education). 
 23. See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the 
Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 
105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 94–95 (2006) (noting that the selective presidential con-
trol of agency regulation, as exercised in part through OIRA, can undermine 
the legitimacy of such regulation). A related danger is that ad hoc review will 
enable agencies to overvalue one consideration at the expense of others. Many 
have argued that OIRA overemphasizes consideration of costs at the expense 
of benefits, which can tilt regulation in an antiregulatory direction. See, e.g., 
Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory 
State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1262–63 (2006) (arguing that uneven applica-
tion of cost-benefit analysis by OIRA can lead to a deregulatory bias). 
 24. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
2245, 2331–39 (2001) (noting the importance of transparency in the OMB and 
of greater White House control of agency regulation). 
 25. See Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as In-
struments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 254–58 (1987) (ar-
guing that congressional monitoring of agency regulation depends in part on 
constituent access to information about such regulation). 
 26. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative 
Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1805–07 (2007) (arguing that congressional 
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minimum, a framework will help on these fronts by promoting 
the regularity and transparency of behavioral analysis as well 
as the rationality and accountability of regulation. 
The framework that we present can be described succinctly 
as follows.27 An agency will ask whether the targeted behavior 
occurs in any of the situations under which individuals are like-
ly to depart from traditional rationality assumptions. When de-
veloping new rules or policies, agencies will account for these 
extra-rational responses. When justifying a regulation under 
cost-benefit analysis, an agency will include behavioral consid-
erations alongside more traditional ones. Accounting for behav-
ioral insights may induce the agency to adopt a different regu-
latory option or different mix of options. For example, an 
energy regulation that involves electric cars may have fewer 
costs and greater benefits if coupled with a plan that includes 
behavioral measures to induce drivers to recharge at optimal 
hours; and it might have fewer costs and greater benefits than 
entirely different alternatives directed at the transportation 
sector. 
Our framework also includes an important assumption 
about behavior that is easily overlooked in the regulatory 
process—that people are concerned with social outcomes in ad-
dition to monetary outcomes (i.e., wealth). For example, as dis-
cussed in more detail below, people seek social status within 
valued social groups and social inclusion (e.g., descriptive 
norms), and they seek to avoid social sanctions (e.g., injunctive 
norms). Furthermore, as with monetary outcomes, they seek 
social outcomes in both rational and extra-rational ways. As in 
other social and behavioral sciences, a number of economists 
have explored the role of preferences for social outcomes in eco-
nomic models.28 The framework we articulate is an attempt to 
 
oversight, particularly when coupled with White House regulatory review, can 
improve the accountability of agency regulation). 
 27. In developing our framework, we build on earlier work that examined 
the implications of behavioral economics for cost-benefit analysis. See Adler, 
supra note 20, at 155–62; Jolls et al., supra note 2, at 1481–85; Sunstein, su-
pra note 7, at 1060–61; Cass R. Sunstein, Willingness to Pay vs. Welfare, 1 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 303, 315–16 (2007). 
 28. For instance, the desires for fairness, altruistic tendencies, and moral-
ity have been extensively researched within economics. See, e.g., Kjell Arne 
Brekke et al., An Economic Model of Moral Motivation, 87 J. PUB. ECON. 1967, 
1968 (2003) (examining the role of moral self-image in influencing prosocial 
behavior); Catherine C. Eckel & Philip J. Grossman, Altruism in Anonymous 
Dictator Games, 16 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 181, 188 (1996) (examining altruism 
as a motivating factor in behavior); Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness 
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incorporate recent theoretical and empirical advancements re-
garding bounded rationality into a simple framework to be used 
in the regulatory process.29 
To implement these insights, our framework does not jetti-
son the classical economic track that focuses largely on the role 
of monetary outcomes in an individual’s utility function. How-
ever, we conceptualize this track as containing two prongs, one 
that assumes rational action and one that takes account of pre-
dictable extra-rational action. We also introduce a parallel 
track that assumes individuals are concerned with social out-
comes. Although social outcomes in theory can be incorporated 
into traditional approaches to utility maximization, too often 
social outcomes are not fully accounted for in the regulatory 
development, review, and selection process.30 As with monetary 
outcomes, we assume that individuals consider social outcomes 
in both rational and extra-rational ways. Under the rational ac-
tor prong of the social outcomes track, we examine the effects of 
social influences (e.g., descriptive norms and status) on deci-
sionmaking. As with monetary outcomes, understanding the ef-
fects of inadequate information is an important part of the 
analysis. After evaluating rational responses to social signals, 
an agency would move to the second prong. Substantively, this 
prong includes behavioral tendencies that deviate from expec-
tations based on a socially rational actor. In some cases these 
tendencies mirror the behavioral quirks discussed in the behav-
ioral economics literature, such as framing effects. In other 
cases, these deviations are specific to social outcomes, such as 
commitment effects or the development of personal norms. 
When we organize the analytical framework in this way, it 
becomes apparent that accounting for extra-rational responses 
to social outcomes is an essential, but largely underappre-
ciated, area of regulatory analysis. If cost-benefit analysis can 
account for rational and extra-rational action regarding mone-
tary outcomes, it also can account for rational and extra-
 
into Game Theory and Economics, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1281, 1282 (1993) (pre-
senting a framework to study implications of fairness in economic situations). 
 29. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, A Perspective on Judgment and Choice: 
Mapping Bounded Rationality, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 697, 697–720 (using the 
term “bounded rationality” as the notion that human decisionmaking is 
bounded by cognitive and informational constraints). 
 30. See, e.g., MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS 
OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 68–73 (2006); Adler, supra note 20, at 160 (noting 
that cost-benefit analysis is “the traditional technique for implementing 
wealth-maximization and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency”). 
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rational action regarding social outcomes.31 Legal scholars have 
hinted at the issue, noting that some behavior responds to so-
cial signals rather than pricing signals—for example, placing 
an emoticon (sad face) on a high electric bill has the potential to 
reduce future energy usage.32 But scholars have not fully inte-
grated this intuition into an analytical framework. Further-
more, they have not explored how individuals sometimes react 
to social signals in a manner that appears to conflict with what 
is socially optimal to that individual, just as individuals react 
to pricing signals in ways that produce suboptimal monetary 
outcomes. 
To make the second prong workable under both the mone-
tary and social outcome assumptions, we add another refine-
ment. Drawing on social psychology and sociology, we argue 
that agencies should consider the multiple levels of influence on 
decisionmaking, including individual-level factors (e.g., income 
and cognition) and social and community-level factors (e.g., lo-
cal infrastructure and peer groups). Although it is not possible 
to incorporate variables at all levels and the analysis will not 
yield a simple quantitative outcome, this addition to the 
framework provides a means for mapping the points of influ-
ence on behavior and identifying convergent or competing in-
fluences. Agencies that recognize opportunities for synergistic 
policy mechanisms (such as normative messaging to reinforce a 
price signal) can take advantage of these opportunities. Simi-
larly, variables that may cause a policy to be ineffective (e.g., 
infrastructure limitations) can be considered in regulatory de-
sign. 
After we sketch our framework, we apply it to two concrete 
examples: policies to encourage electric cars, as mentioned 
above, and policies to encourage investments in energy efficient 
appliances.33 We show that accounting for behavioral insights 
 
 31. Cf. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 21, at 1119–20 (identifying a 
matrix including property rules and liability rules with entitlements assigned 
to polluters or victims, and noting that the framework leads to the insight that 
a liability-rule-protected entitlement might be assigned to a polluter as well as 
a victim). The importance of analyzing non-rational responses to social out-
come maximization emerges from our framework in a similar way. See discus-
sion infra Part II.A.2.b. 
 32. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 68–69. 
 33. Individual and household behavioral changes could reduce U.S. carbon 
emissions by seven percent in ten years. See Thomas Dietz, Gerald T. Gard-
ner, Jonathan Gilligan, Paul C. Stern & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Household 
Actions Can Provide a Behavioral Wedge to Rapidly Reduce U.S. Carbon 
Emissions, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 18,452, at 18,452 (2009). 
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may require agency officials to suspend intuition regarding the 
most effective ways to influence behavior and to frame informa-
tion. We also show that agency officials may need to develop 
more comprehensive and creative policy measures. Using these 
examples, we show that the payoffs for well-designed programs 
can be substantial.  
We do not resolve all uncertainties in the application of our 
framework. The behavioral research of the last several decades 
has not provided all of the information that agency officials 
need to consider preferences regarding social outcomes com-
prehensively. We expect that behavioral analysis will develop 
incrementally and cautiously, just as cost-benefit analysis did 
in its early years when it focused only on cost effectiveness and 
was only able to draw on limited or experimental data to sup-
port various aspects of the analysis.34 Thus, we expect that 
agencies will conduct behavioral analysis in some cases with 
less data than what has come to be expected for modern cost-
benefit analysis. But that will change over time, and will do so 
sooner as a result of the systematic application of the type of 
analysis that our framework facilitates. As we note above, our 
framework also identifies promising new areas for behavioral 
research. Such research could provide the data that would al-
low agency officials to design policies that reflect behavioral in-
sights, and would facilitate more rigorous evaluation of the 
costs and benefits of such policies.35 In particular, it may be 
necessary to develop new lines of research within social psy-
chology and sociology to examine extra-rational patterns of be-
havior in pursuit of social outcomes. It also may be necessary 
for agencies and OIRA to add social psychologists, sociologists, 
and other behavioral experts to their regulatory teams.36 
If agencies identify early wins using behavioral and social 
science insights, the current momentum will continue. Similar-
ly, if OIRA continues to signal that it values and takes the im-
 
 34. In the Carter Administration, economic analysis of regulations was 
conducted to determine only the cost effectiveness of regulatory actions. See 
Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving 
Federal Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 
1489, 1505–06 (2002). Benefits analysis was added in the Reagan Administra-
tion. Id.; see also W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Equity, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 843, 854 (2000). 
 35. For a discussion of regulatory instrument choice, see Jonathan Baert 
Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Con-
text, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 679–80, 704–35 (1999). 
 36. The recent OIRA memorandum on the use of behavioral approaches 
notes the importance of consulting with behavioral scientists and of conducting 
rigorous empirical studies. See 2010 OIRA Disclosure Memo, supra note 5, at 5. 
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plications seriously, then agencies are more likely to follow 
suit.37 We also can imagine that certain administrative law re-
quirements might help prompt agency officials to consider se-
riously the findings of behavioral analysis. If behavioral analy-
sis is necessary to a rational decision, then courts can ensure 
that agencies consider it under the “arbitrary and capricious” 
standard of the Administrative Procedure Act.38 And if agencies 
rely on behavioral analysis in making a decision, then courts 
can review the adequacy of the analysis.39 It is not our goal to 
address these issues until we see the effects of a more syste-
matic application of behavioral analysis.40 
Finally, we do not attempt to wade into the debate about 
the precise form of cost-benefit analysis that agencies or OIRA 
should perform,41 or whether entirely different alternatives are 
preferable.42 Whether conducted as a part of traditional cost-
benefit analysis, as a parallel process that yields results that 
accompany the results of the cost-benefit analysis, or as a part 
of some alternative process, we believe that a structured, rigor-
ous approach to behavioral insights will enhance the likelihood 
that agencies will make effective, rational, and accountable de-
cisions. 
 
 37. Id. 
 38. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2007); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42–43 (1983) (interpreting the “arbitrary and 
capricious standard” of the Administrative Procedure Act to require that agen-
cies demonstrate that they have considered all relevant factors and all impor-
tant aspects of a problem). 
 39. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943) (requiring the Agen-
cy to reveal the actual basis on which it relied and declining to uphold the 
agency’s decision on any other basis). 
 40. Likewise, we do not and cannot address whether behavioral or tradi-
tional economic analysis should prevail in cases of conflict. Our framework 
does not purport to provide a fully integrated model; indeed, pursuit of such a 
model is akin to pursuit of the Holy Grail. These sorts of issues are not exclu-
sive to behavioral analysis. In some sense, they are present in the classic conflict 
between agency expertise and political accountability in administrative law. 
See Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics 
to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51 (2008) (using the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), to discuss the tension between 
administrative expertise and political accountability). When technocratic 
judgment and political responsiveness point in different directions, agencies 
are forced to make a choice (and sometimes courts may have a say as well). 
 41. See, e.g., ADLER & POSNER, supra note 30, at 68–100. 
 42. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Rethinking the Role of Cost-Benefit Analy-
sis, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1355, 1379–96 (2009) (arguing that the European regu-
latory model is a superior alternative to cost-benefit analysis for regulating 
toxic chemicals).  
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This Article proceeds in four Parts. In Part I, we discuss 
the role of models for predicting behavior in regulatory devel-
opment and review, and the limits of the price mechanism that 
often is the selected regulatory instrument for problems ana-
lyzed using the dominant rational-actor model. Part II suggests 
an analytical framework to ensure that behavioral insights ful-
fill their promise of improving the efficacy of regulation while 
simultaneously promoting the rationality and accountability of 
regulation. To illustrate the framework, Part III then applies it 
to regulatory actions aimed at improving energy efficiency and 
reducing carbon emissions. This Article concludes that the pro-
posed analytical framework is an important first step in the 
process of incorporating behavioral insights into regulatory de-
velopment and review and ultimately the selection of regulato-
ry objectives. 
I.  MODELS FOR PREDICTING BEHAVIOR: THEORETICAL 
BACKGROUND   
In this Part, we describe the regulatory environment in 
which behavioral economics and social science research has 
emerged. Specifically, we discuss the role of models for predict-
ing behavior in regulatory development, review, and selection. 
We show that a rational-actor model leads to a heavy reliance 
on the price mechanism, which seeks to change behavior by in-
creasing the monetary cost of undesired behaviors and decreas-
ing the cost of desired behaviors. Furthermore, we examine the 
limits of the price mechanism for predicting behavior and show 
that consideration of complementary or alternative regulatory 
instruments will often lead to more effective, efficient, and po-
litically viable regulation. 
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF MODELS FOR PREDICTING BEHAVIOR 
Agencies use implicit or explicit models when evaluating 
the anticipated response of regulated entities, whether individ-
uals or firms, to various regulatory instruments.43 The model 
that an agency selects affects its regulatory initiative from in-
ception through OMB regulatory review to agency regulatory 
adoption and judicial review.44 Whether an agency chooses to 
 
 43. Cf. Kahneman, supra note 29, at 705–06 (discussing how assumptions 
about and models of human behavior frame decisions that aim to maximize 
utility). 
 44. Cf. Gregory Scott Crespi, The Fatal Flaw of Cost-Benefit Analysis: The 
Problem of Person-Altering Consequences, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,703, at 10,703 
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adopt a regulatory directive (e.g., a traditional command-and-
control regulation), an economic incentive (e.g., tax, subsidy, or 
cap-and-trade scheme), a liability scheme, an informational 
disclosure requirement, or other measure, it must consider the 
expected response of the regulated community. In fact, this 
consideration affects all aspects of the policy choice, including 
the level of resources the agency devotes to the effort, which 
regulatory tool (if any) it ultimately selects from the alterna-
tives, and the outcome the regulatory tool is expected to 
achieve. 
Yet agencies face barriers in evaluating the effects of regu-
lation on the regulated community. Among the leading barriers 
is the inability of simple models to predict responses to inter-
ventions by the regulated community, such as efforts designed 
to reduce energy use and carbon emissions.45 For example, 
price is an important factor, but household energy strategies 
that rely on assumptions of rational responses to price signals 
(e.g., increasing the price of electricity to induce efficiency and 
conservation) or price signals combined with new technologies 
often yield disappointing results.46 In the absence of an accessi-
 
n.1 (2008) (“Prospective cost-benefit analyses of rulemaking initiatives and 
subsequent OIRA review (and, upon occasion, also judicial review) now appear 
to be entrenched as a significant feature of the federal regulatory process.” (ci-
tation omitted)). 
 45. See Paul C. Stern, Toward a Coherent Theory of Environmentally Sig-
nificant Behavior, 56 J. SOC. ISSUES 407, 419–20 (2000); Michael P. Vanden-
bergh, Order Without Social Norms: How Personal Norms Can Protect the En-
vironment, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1101, 1103–06 (2005); Charlie Wilson & Hadi 
Dowlatabadi, Models of Decision Making and Residential Energy Use, 32 ANN. 
REV. ENV’T & RESOURCES 169, 189 (2007). Our focus here is on individuals 
and households, although many of the behavioral insights are relevant to the 
behavior of small businesses, large corporations, and nonprofit organizations 
as well. Of course, behavioral analysis could just provide policymakers with a 
means to “avoid painful but more effective solutions rooted in traditional eco-
nomics,” such as removing subsidies or introducing taxes. George Loewenstein 
& Peter Ubel, Economics Behaving Badly, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2010, at A31, 
available at 2010 WLNR 14148206; see also Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and 
Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and 
Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 72 (2002) (positing that a 
middle ground between perfect rationality and equal incompetence illuminates 
ways the legal system may foster rational or counter-irrational behavior). We 
note that behavioral measures need not displace traditional regulatory meas-
ures, however. In many cases, behavioral measures may supplement traditional 
measures or may fill gaps when public support is lacking for such measures. 
 46. See, e.g., Paul C. Stern, Blind Spots in Policy Analysis: What Econom-
ics Doesn’t Say About Energy Use, 5 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 200, 210–11 
(1986) (noting that when the monetary value of price incentives for energy ef-
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ble account that reflects the complex influences on behavior, 
regulators all too often appear to rely solely on the price mech-
anism or to fall back on common intuitions. The magnitude of 
the price increase necessary to achieve the desired behavior 
change solely from financial incentives, however, often under-
mines the political viability of the price mechanism.47 In addi-
tion, approaches that do not account for behavioral insights 
may discourage the development of more viable policy options 
and can even lead to counterproductive results.48 
B. THE EXTENT AND LIMITS OF RATIONAL ACTION 
Rational choice theory (RCT) underlies the dominant mod-
el for analysis of regulatory policy alternatives, including those 
that affect individuals and households. Although there are mul-
tiple interpretations of RCT,49 a common assumption is that 
individuals are rational actors whose decisions are driven by 
the desire to maximize utility given resource constraints.50 
RCT, at its core, assumes that individuals hold stable pref-
erences and seek out the necessary information regarding their 
set of options prior to making a decision. Ultimately, decisions 
are made on the basis of a deliberate analysis of the expected 
payoffs of a set of options, considering both their desirability 
and their probability of occurring. A choice is considered ra-
 
ficiency investments are held constant, participation rates can vary by a factor 
of ten due to non-price-related factors). 
 47. See, e.g., W. Ross Morrow et al., Analysis of Policies to Reduce Oil Con-
sumption and Greenhouse-Gas Emissions from the U.S. Transportation Sector, 
38 ENERGY POL’Y 1305, 1317–18 (2010) (concluding that a price of gasoline be-
tween $5.00 and $7.00 per gallon would be necessary to achieve a fourteen 
percent U.S. reduction in greenhouse gas emissions below 2005 levels by 2025). 
 48. See, e.g., Robert B. Cialdini, Crafting Normative Messages to Protect 
the Environment, 12 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 105, 108–09 (2003) 
(noting that public education campaigns that communicate that an undesira-
ble behavior is “regrettably frequent” can lead to an increase in the undesira-
ble behavior by sending the descriptively normative message that the behavior 
is common and therefore acceptable); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Beyond Eleg-
ance: A Testable Typology of Social Norms in Corporate Environmental Com-
pliance, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 104–05, 115 (2003) (discussing studies on 
the unintended effects of regulatory interventions on tax compliance); Viscusi, 
supra note 22, at 326–27 (discussing unintended consequences of child-
resistant bottle caps). 
 49. For a discussion of the interpretations of the rational-actor model, see 
Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 19, at 1070–74. 
 50. For a discussion of the assumptions and variations of rational choice 
theory, see Andrew M. Colman, Cooperation, Psychological Game Theory, and 
Limitations of Rationality in Social Interaction, 26 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 139, 
139–43 (2003), and Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 19, at 1060–66. 
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tional if there is no alternative that provides a more optimal 
outcome to the individual.51 
The specific criteria by which the utility of an outcome is 
measured have been heavily disputed by those within the be-
havioral sciences. In the narrowest application of RCT, individ-
ual utility is measured largely in terms of monetary self-
interest.52 As such, nonmonetary benefits such as social inclu-
sion or an environment free of litter are generally assumed to 
be excluded from the cost-benefit calculations of rational indi-
viduals.53 Given the wealth of behavioral data to suggest a 
broader set of motivations are in play, many economists no 
longer subscribe to this limited interpretation of self-interest.54 
However, this approach remains prominent within law and 
economics at least implicitly, as seen in the types of policy 
mechanisms that are often advocated.55 A number of potential 
reasons may explain the continued persistence of this ap-
proach. First, a rigid view of individual utility does allow for a 
clearly defined baseline from which to develop behavioral pre-
dictions, which the more expanded interpretations of rationali-
ty do not provide. Although a substantial degree of variance 
may exist in how individuals respond to price mechanisms, the 
thick version of RCT allows for clear predictions about those 
responses in the aggregate.56 An expanded definition of utility 
may require agencies to spend substantial time and money on 
research into the effectiveness of regulatory alternatives. Simi-
 
 51. For a more detailed discussion of rational choice theory, see GARY S. 
BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 3–14 (1976); Col-
man, supra note 50, at 139–43; and Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 19, at 1060–66. 
 52. See Adler, supra note 20, at 158–59; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 19, 
at 1064–65; see also Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1231, 
1237–38 & n.12 (2001) (noting that measuring utility entirely based on mone-
tary incentives is often described as a “thick” approach to utility).  
 53. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 19, at 1065. 
 54. See, e.g., Loewenstein et al., supra note 8, at 661 (noting that the posi-
tion that individuals act only according to pure self-interest is a minority posi-
tion within economics); Posner, supra note 19, at 1551–52 (explaining his 
broadly defined interpretation of rational action as well as the point that the 
economic analysis of law has “long ago abandoned the model of hyper rational, 
emotionless, unsocial, supremely egoistic, nonstrategic man (or woman)”).  
 55. See Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and So-
cial Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1603, 1622 n.39 (2000); see also Loewenstein & 
Ubel, supra note 45, at A31. 
 56. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 19, at 1057 n.18 (positing that ag-
gregate behavior follows predictions of rational choice theory even where indi-
viduals deviate from that behavior, so long as those deviations are symmetri-
cally distributed). 
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larly, regulations that anticipate individual variation in res-
ponses to law and policy may require a substantial degree of 
segmentation and tailoring to regulatory targets. Again, al-
though potentially more effective, the broader approach sacri-
fices scalability and therefore may not be feasible in some cir-
cumstances.  
In the broadest applications of RCT, individuals are con-
ceived of as rational in the sense that they act deliberately to 
maximize their own interests; yet the individual’s interests are 
subjectively defined.57 Thus, an individual could act to maxi-
mize objectively defined monetary outcomes or subjectively de-
fined social outcomes. However, in both cases one should expect 
that the individual will act in a manner that is consistent with 
his or her own goals. It is this version of RCT that has been 
most often applied by psychologists and those in the social 
sciences, as well as a growing number of economists, because it 
accommodates both monetary and social drivers of behavior 
such as group membership and social norms.58 The emphasis 
on subjective, rather than objective, well-being is largely due to 
a growing field of research that has revealed a host of non-
monetary motivators that influence decisionmaking, sometimes 
to the point of overwhelming the role of financial self-interest. 
For example, a preference for the status quo leads many to 
maintain retirement plans that are economically suboptimal 
and unnecessarily risky.59 Similarly, social dilemma experi-
ments have shown that despite predictions based on a rational-
actor model, individuals display a remarkable willingness to 
cooperate in some situations.60 This is particularly true when 
 
 57. See Carlson, supra note 52, at 1237–38 (noting that this is often de-
scribed as a “thin” approach to utility). For a discussion of thin conceptions of 
utility, see Jolls et al., supra note 2, at 1479 (discussing “bounded self-
interest”), and Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 19, at 1061–62. 
 58. See Robyn M. Dawes, Social Dilemmas, 31 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 169, 
175–78 (1980) (discussing an expanded definition of utility that includes non-
monetary outcomes); Posner, supra note 19, at 1551–52. 
 59. William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Deci-
sion Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 31–33 (1988). 
 60. In a meta-analysis of over one hundred social dilemma experiments, 
David Sally found an average cooperation rate of forty-seven percent within 
one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma games, although cooperation varied widely de-
pending on the situational variables manipulated in the studies. David Sally, 
Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-Analysis of Expe-
riments From 1958 to 1992, 7 RATIONALITY & SOC’Y 58, 60–62 (1995). In their 
review of this literature, Robyn Dawes and Richard Thaler state that coopera-
tion rates in one-shot social dilemmas typically range between forty and sixty 
percent, even though rational choice theory (where utility is measured by 
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the individual feels a sense of social connectedness or reciproci-
ty with the other individuals involved in the dilemma.61 Other 
work finds that individuals will go to great lengths to conform 
to the attitudes and beliefs of those around them, even when 
conforming violates known facts or one’s own ideological 
worldview.62 
In addition to questions about the definition of self-
interest, additional work within the behavioral sciences has 
questioned whether we can assume that individuals actually 
make calculated considerations of costs and benefits, even 
when self-interest is expanded to include noneconomic drivers 
of behavior. For example, empirical studies have challenged the 
view that individuals truly hold a set of stable preferences, as is 
presumed by RCT. Psychologists and behavioral economists 
have found that preferences are highly contingent on factors 
such as how choices are framed and the temporal distance be-
tween costs and benefits.63 The seminal work of Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky revealed that humans rely heav-
ily on decisional heuristics that reduce cognitive effort, but 
 
monetary self-interest) would predict a zero percent cooperation rate. Robyn 
M. Dawes & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Cooperation, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 
187, 188–89 (1988). 
 61. See Robyn M. Dawes & David M. Messick, Social Dilemmas, 35 INT’L 
J. PSYCHOL. 111, 114 (2000) (noting that social identification with others in-
volved in social dilemmas leads to greater levels of cooperation); Peter Kollock, 
Social Dilemmas: The Anatomy of Cooperation, 24 ANN. REV. SOC. 183, 195–97 
(1998) (reviewing literature on the influence of reciprocity norms on decision-
making in social dilemmas). 
 62. For example, Solomon Asch demonstrated that roughly one-third of 
individuals will give an obviously incorrect answer to a simple line judgment 
task when that answer is given by the others in the room. Solomon E. Asch, 
Effects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgments, 
in GROUPS, LEADERSHIP AND MEN 177, 177–81, 186 (Howard Guetzkow ed., 
1951). Geoffrey Cohen has found that support of a welfare policy among liber-
als and conservatives depends more on whether the policy is endorsed by a 
Republican or Democrat than on the actual content of the policy. Geoffrey L. 
Cohen, Party Over Policy: The Dominating Impact of Group Influence on Polit-
ical Beliefs, 85 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 808, 819 (2003). 
 63. See Stephen J. Hoch & George F. Loewenstein, Time-Inconsistent Pref-
erences and Consumer Self-Control, 17 J. CONSUMER RES. 492, 497 (1991) (dis-
cussing the impact of temporal proximity on consumer preferences); Kahne-
man & Tversky, supra note 2, at 143–44 (discussing how the framing of 
possible outcomes may change individual preferences); Amos Tversky & Da-
niel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 
SCIENCE 453, 453–58 (1985) (discussing how the framing of prospects, contin-
gencies, and outcomes can lead to preference reversals). 
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these decision rules often lead to suboptimal outcomes.64 Even 
when the motivation is to conform to a social norm, individuals 
do not always appear to make a deliberate or calculated deci-
sion about many behaviors.65 
Despite its shortcomings, RCT continues to be a dominant 
model in legal and policy frameworks.66 As mentioned, it pro-
vides a clear starting place from which to make behavioral pre-
dictions. Meanwhile, psychological and sociological theories 
that offer a more nuanced understanding of human behavior 
are often applied on an ad hoc basis.67 Predictions and tests of 
those predictions are often specific to a single outcome variable, 
or subset of behaviors.68 Although this approach may allow for 
a more detailed understanding of the variables that influence 
specific behaviors within certain populations, it fails to offer a 
simple and comprehensive model that can be applied across 
multiple contexts and groups.69 Furthermore, without the pres-
sure that has existed within law and economics to develop a 
single, overarching framework and broadly applicable laws and 
policies,70 psychology and sociology have suffered from theory 
inflation. The litany of models and variables that have been re-
vealed to influence behavior has seemed to spiral out of control 
 
 64. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncer-
tainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: 
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 3–20 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (review-
ing several judgmental heuristics and the cognitive biases they tend to pro-
duce). For a review of cognitive heuristics in decisionmaking, see Daniel 
Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Econom-
ics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449 (2003). 
 65. Jessica Nolan and her coauthors found that while individuals believed 
that the behavior of their neighbors had little impact on their own energy-use 
behaviors, the data showed that descriptive norms were the strongest predic-
tor of actual behavior. Jessica M. Nolan et al., Normative Social Influence Is 
Underdetected, 34 PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 913, 920–21 (2008).  
 66. See Wilson & Dowlatabadi, supra note 45, at 172 (analyzing rational 
choice as a building block of economic theory). 
 67. See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 2, at 12 (listing multiple theories of eco-
nomically relevant psychology that he does not apply to his analysis). 
 68. See Bernice A. Pescosolido, Beyond Rational Choice: The Social Dy-
namics of How People Seek Help, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1096, 1102 (1992) (describing 
how certain actions or choices are targeted for testing, while others are ignored). 
 69. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax 
Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 1781, 1788–89 (2000) (concluding that the effects 
of personal norms are not valuable for explaining tax behavior); Scott, supra 
note 55, at 1622 n.39 (explaining that personal norms are not consistent with 
environmental behavior). 
 70. See, e.g., Wilson & Dowlatabadi, supra note 45, at 172 (describing ra-
tional choice theory as background to economics and policy decisions). 
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in some cases.71 Identical or nearly identical theories or con-
structs are often referred to under different names across sub-
disciplines (and even sometimes within a subdiscipline).72 This 
has created a sense of confusion among those who are not 
trained within these disciplines and has led many to embrace 
the more simplified rational-choice model for its parsimony, if 
not its precision.73 
The continued reliance on RCT has had several effects on 
regulatory decisionmaking. Foremost, it has fostered continued 
reliance on price mechanisms as regulatory instruments.74 
Whether through regulation, Pigouvian taxes and subsidies, or 
Coasian cap-and-trade measures, regulators often seek to 
change behavior by increasing the monetary cost of undesirable 
behavior or lowering the price of desirable behavior.75 Although 
it is clear that prices affect behavior, the degree of variance in 
response to price-based mechanisms is often overlooked. For 
example, energy efficiency policies and programs around the 
country have predominantly operated under the theory that 
cost-effective technologies and practices will sell themselves.76 
Rational-actor models assume that if cost structures are favor-
able to the consumer, individuals will behave rationally.77 Yet, 
decades of research suggest that, despite a preponderance of 
cost-effective options, only a limited investment in these tech-
 
 71. See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 2, at 12 (listing a multitude of psychology 
theories that researchers use to explain behavior). 
 72. This problem has been noted by multiple researchers within psycholo-
gy and is sometimes referred to as the “jangle fallacy.” See, e.g., Jack Block, 
Three Tasks for Personality Psychology, in DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE AND THE 
HOLISTIC APPROACH 155, 156–57 (Lars R. Bergman et al. eds., 2000); see also 
Michael W. Katzko, The Rhetoric of Psychological Research and the Problem of 
Unification in Psychology, 57 AM. PSYCHOL. 262, 264–69 (2002). 
 73. See Stern, supra note 46, at 200–01 (explaining how policy analysts 
use the simplified rational-actor theory). 
 74. See, e.g., Morrow et al., supra note 47, at 1307–08 (examining several 
federal programs using financial incentives to influence individual behavior). 
 75. See LOREN LUTZENHISER ET AL., CAL. INST. FOR ENERGY AND ENV’T, 
BEHAVIOR AND ENERGY PROGRAM, BEHAVIORAL ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING 
CALIFORNIA RESIDENTIAL SECTOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS 20–24 
(2009), available at http://uc-ciee.org/pubs/ref_behavior.html; MICHAEL J. 
SULLIVAN, CAL. INST. FOR ENERGY AND ENV’T, BEHAVIOR AND ENERGY 
PROGRAM, BEHAVIORAL ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING ENERGY EFFICIENCY 
PROGRAMS FOR BUSINESSES 21–24 (2009), available at http://uc-ciee.org/pubs/ 
ref_behavior.html (concluding that rational decision models lead to an over-
emphasis on information- and price-based approaches); Wiener, supra note 35, 
at 704–35 (discussing economic theory and other instruments of regulation). 
 76. See Wilson & Dowlatabadi, supra note 45, at 172. 
 77. Id. 
  
736 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:715 
 
nologies has occurred (i.e., the “efficiency gap”).78 Price clearly 
matters, but research suggests that the role of price varies 
widely depending on the situation. In some cases, price ac-
counts for less variance in behavior than other factors, such as 
a psychological commitment or social norms.79 In other cases, 
the effectiveness of price-based mechanisms can be bolstered 
when paired with well-designed behavioral interventions.80 
The success of price-based policies also depends heavily on 
non-price-related features. Participation rates in a set of home 
efficiency programs that offer identical financial incentive 
packages vary by a factor of ten.81 Nonfinancial variables such 
as program marketing and management explain much of this 
variance.82 Furthermore, nonfinancial factors become more im-
portant in determining program success as the incentive be-
comes more attractive to the consumer.83 In many cases, effi-
cient and effective incentive programs thus require program 
design, implementation, and marketing that build on social 
scientific expertise in consumer decisionmaking.84 This is true 
even when the incentive package is highly favorable for the 
consumers to make efficiency upgrades that would otherwise be 
cost prohibitive.85 
Individuals also can be induced to change their behavior in 
many cases even when no economic incentives are present. In-
terventions such as feedback, peer education, and social mar-
keting campaigns have successfully reduced energy use among 
office employees, dormitory residents, and individuals living on 
military bases.86 In each of these cases, individuals were not fi-
 
 78. See Marilyn A. Brown, Market Failures and Barriers as a Basis for 
Clean Energy Policies, 29 ENERGY POL’Y 1197, 1198–99 (2001); Charles, supra 
note 3, at 810–11. 
 79. See Thomas A. Heberlein & G. Keith Warriner, The Influence of Price 
and Attitude on Shifting Residential Electricity Consumption From On- to Off-
Peak Periods, 4 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 107, 125 (1983); Nolan et al., supra note 
65, at 921. 
 80. See Rosenthal, supra note 13, at A3. 
 81. See Stern, supra note 45, at 210–11. 
 82. See id. 
 83. See Wilson & Dowlatabadi, supra note 46, at 174 (explaining how in-
dividual preferences are not fixed). 
 84. Id. at 174–75 (discussing the importance of framing the decisions 
available to consumers in intervention programs). 
 85. See generally id. at 175 (emphasizing how consumers are influenced 
more by comfort and fulfilled desires than by energy efficiency when renovat-
ing their homes). 
 86. For a workplace example, see Amanda R. Carrico & Manuel Riemer, 
Motivating Pro-Environmental Behavior in an Organizational Setting: The 
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nancially responsible for their energy consumption.87 Other in-
terventions, such as time-of-use information about usage and 
costs, have reduced energy use even without changes in price. 
For example, providing households with real-time feedback 
about their electricity consumption has been associated with 
reductions in home energy use within a range of five to fifteen 
percent with no accompanying rate changes.88 Similar results 
have been reported with real-time fuel economy feedback in 
personal motor vehicles.89  
In addition to a narrow focus on price mechanisms, RCT 
has also induced regulators to rely on technological solutions to 
reduce behavioral impacts rather than strategies to modify be-
havior. Again, to draw on examples from the energy policy liter-
ature, raising efficiency standards for household appliances 
and creating price-based incentives to induce households to 
adopt new, more efficient appliances have been a major focus of 
residential energy policy initiatives.90 Technologies that lower 
the energy intensity of behavior without sacrificing comfort or 
performance provide a solution that fits easily within the pa-
rameters of RCT. So long as individuals respond rationally to 
price incentives to acquire new equipment, have adequate in-
formation about the use of the equipment, and make rational 
decisions based on that information, these policies should 
achieve positive results. Each of these assumptions has serious 
limitations when applied to households, however, and policies 
that account for behavioral insights regarding technology up-
take and use are in their infancy.91 Technologies designed to 
 
Use of Feedback and Peer Education to Reduce Energy Use (2009) (unpub-
lished abstract) (on file with author). For a dormitory example, see John E. 
Petersen et al., Dormitory Residents Reduce Electricity Consumption When 
Exposed to Real-Time Visual Feedback and Incentives, 8 INT’L. J. 
SUSTAINABILITY HIGHER EDUC. 16, 29 (2007). For a military base example, see 
Andrea H. McMakin et al., Motivating Residents to Conserve Energy Without 
Financial Incentives, 34 ENVTL. BEHAV. 848, 856 (2002). 
 87. See McMakin et al., supra note 86, at 849; Petersen et al., supra note 
86, at 18; Carrico & Riemer, supra note 86. 
 88. For a review, see Wokje Abrahamse et al., A Review of Intervention 
Studies Aimed at Household Energy Conservation, 25 J. ENV’T PSYCH. 273, 
278–79 (2005). 
 89. See, e.g., infra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 90. See Abhijit Banerjee & Barry D. Solomon, Eco-Labeling for Energy Ef-
ficiency and Sustainability: A Meta-Evaluation of US Programs, 31 ENERGY 
POL’Y 109, 111–12 (2003) (describing the purpose of various energy conserva-
tion policies). 
 91. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENERGY USE: THE HUMAN DIMENSION 
184 (1984) (explaining how individual behavior associated with energy use is 
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conserve energy, such as programmable thermostats or ap-
pliances with integrated energy-saving settings, are effective 
only to the extent to which the consumer adopts the new tech-
nologies and uses them correctly.92 In addition, policies de-
signed to encourage curtailment behavior, such as reducing 
motor vehicle idling, lowering highway driving speeds, or set-
ting back thermostats, have received substantially less atten-
tion. 
Although policies to encourage investments in efficiency 
and other technological improvements offer promising solu-
tions, measures that focus exclusively on price and technology 
often have limited success. For example, the occurrence of “take 
back effects,” in which a portion of the achievable savings from 
efficiency improvements are “taken back” due to an increase in 
the use of energy,93 demonstrates the danger of neglecting the 
behavioral dimension of energy consumption. In many cases, 
efficiency gains achieved through improvements in architecture 
or technology have been partially or completely overcome by a 
population that is acquiring more goods and using them more 
intensively. For example, technological improvements have in-
creased the efficiency of refrigerators by around seventy-five 
percent over the past few decades;94 however, the number of 
U.S. households that own two or more refrigerators has also in-
creased by roughly the same margin.95 Behavioral measures 
can supplement price and technology in ways that are less like-
 
often not incorporated into policy analysis, but should be in new programs and 
policies). 
 92. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 78, at 1198 (citing a study where the ma-
jority of consumers did not purchase the energy efficient appliances, but instead 
purchased cheaper appliances that consumed more energy in the long run). 
 93. See, e.g., Mathias Binswanger, Technological Progress and Sustaina-
ble Development: What About the Rebound Effect?, 36 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 119, 
130 (2001); Horace Herring, Energy Efficiency—A Critical View, 31 ENERGY 
10, 12 (2006). 
 94. For a review, see Jack N. Barkenbus, Putting Energy Efficiency in a 
Sustainability Context, 48 ENVIRONMENT 10, 12 (2006). 
 95. According to surveys conducted by the Energy Information Adminis-
tration, thirteen percent of households surveyed in 1987 owned two or more 
refrigerators compared to twenty-two percent of those surveyed in 2005. See 
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., RESIDENTIAL ENERGY 
CONSUMPTION SURVEY, PRESENCE OF APPLIANCES (1987), available at http:// 
www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/recs/recspubuse87/87publicuse.html; U.S. DEP’T OF 
ENERGY, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., RESIDENTIAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION SURVEY, 
KITCHEN APPLIANCES (2005), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/recs/ 
recspubuse05/pubuse05.html. 
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ly to induce consumers to simply redirect savings from efficien-
cy to other energy-using activities.  
In addition, the assumption that individuals only respond 
to price signals and that new technologies are only valuable 
when linked to monetary incentives may lead regulators to 
abandon the field altogether if they lack the political support to 
change the price of the targeted behavior. Policies that link new 
technology uptake to price signals in some cases can generate 
opposition to both. Perhaps the most striking recent example is 
the initial decision by the Maryland Public Service Commission 
to reject a utility proposal to install 1.36 million smart meters 
in homes.96 The utility linked the proposal directly to peak de-
mand pricing, which drew political fire from consumer and re-
tiree advocates.97 
Although the use of behavioral insights often will require 
resisting common intuitions about behavior, when applied 
properly, the payoff of policies that reflect a wider range of in-
fluences on behavior can be substantial. Behavioral research on 
household responses to energy information suggests that a pro-
posal to install smart meters that simply provide feedback to 
household energy users might have yielded substantial use re-
ductions—although less than when coupled with a price meas-
ure—and it might face far less political resistance.98 After con-
sumers become more comfortable with the new smart meter 
technology, the peak pricing measures may generate less politi-
cal resistance. In addition to reducing political or consumer 
backlash, incorporating behavioral insights into a wide range of 
household energy programs can yield success rates as much as 
 
 96. See Peter Behr, Md.’s Veto of Advance Meter Deployment Stuns Smart 
Grid Advocates, CLIMATEWIRE (June 23, 2010), http://www.eenews.net/public/ 
climatewire/2010/06/23/1. 
 97. See id. (“While some state utility commissions are willing to back 
smart meter deployment, they are reluctant to approve new ‘dynamic’ electric-
ity rate plans that allow prices to rise during the day when power demand 
peaks.”). The utility later modified the program and obtained regulatory ap-
proval. See Peter Behr, Md. Smart Meter Plan Advances with Consumer Bene-
fits as a Measure, CLIMATEWIRE (Aug. 18, 2010), http://www.eenews.net/cw/ 
(search “ClimateWire” for “Md. Smart Meter Plan Advances”; then follow 
“Grid” hyperlink) (“The commission emphasized, ‘the success of this initiative, 
and the likelihood that customers will actually see the benefits this project 
promises, depend centrally on the success of the company’s customer educa-
tion and communication effort.’”). 
 98. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 91, at 39–41 (demon-
strating how feedback on energy use, without cost savings, may be insufficient 
to get customers to change their energy usage). 
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ten times greater than poorly designed ones.99 For example, 
well-designed community-based efforts in Hood River, Oregon 
induced eighty-five percent of eligible households to participate 
in a home retrofit program.100 Likewise, energy trends in Cali-
fornia reflect nearly four decades of state policy directed toward 
efficiency standards and demand-side management programs, 
and some of these programs have reflected behavioral in-
sights.101 During this time, per capita electricity consumption 
in California remained stable while the national average grew 
by forty percent (i.e., the Rosenfeld Effect).102 This was 
achieved while California simultaneously outperformed the na-
tional average in per capita economic growth.103 Although a 
host of factors contributed to this trend (e.g., urbanization and 
changes in fuel sources), conservative estimates suggest that at 
least a quarter of the difference between per capita energy con-
sumption in the United States and California can be attributed 
to policy measures directed toward energy use and efficiency.104 
The proportion of the difference that is attributable to behav-
ioral measures is not known, but the Rosenfeld Effect suggests 
the potential gains that a state can achieve from well-designed 
energy conservation and efficiency efforts. 
 
 
 99. Nearly identical incentive programs directed toward home efficiency 
improvements within similar geographic areas have varied by a factor of ten. 
For a review, see Stern, supra note 46, at 210–11. Differential success rates of 
these programs have been primarily attributed to marketing and implementa-
tion of the program. Id. 
 100. Eric Hirst, The Hood River Conservation Project: A Unique Research 
and Demonstration Effort, 13 ENERGY & BUILDINGS 3, 8 (1989). 
 101. For a review of California’s Flex Your Power campaign in response to 
the energy crisis of 2001, see Sylvia L. Bender et al., Using Mass Media to In-
fluence Energy Consumption Behavior: California’s 2001 Flex Your Power 
Campaign as a Case Study 8.15, 8.17 (2002), available at http://citeseerx.ist 
.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.156.8308&rep=rep1&type=pdf (examin-
ing the campaign’s formulation, implementation, and strategic evolution of its 
themes). For a brief description of California’s utility-sponsored demand side 
management programs, including programs targeted at promoting efficiency 
adoption and energy curtailment, see Elsia O. Galawish, DSM Accomplishments 
in California: PG&E’s Experience, 9 RENEWABLE ENERGY 1295, 1296 (1996). 
 102. See Charles, supra note 3, at 805. 
 103. Id. 
 104. James Sweeney & Anant Sudarshan, Deconstructing the “Rosenfeld 
Curve” 1 (June 1, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://piee 
.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/docs/publications/Deconstructing_the_Rosenfeld_Curve.pdf. 
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II.  AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK   
Given the importance of behavioral insights, the pressing 
question is how to integrate them successfully into regulatory 
analysis. Agency officials have begun to make regulatory deci-
sions that reflect behavioral considerations.105 OIRA officials, 
for example, have announced an intention to broaden tradi-
tional cost-benefit analysis to explicitly include such considera-
tions and have provided initial points for agencies to consid-
er.106 But a framework has not yet emerged that can enable 
regulators to conduct a systematic and concrete analysis of oth-
erwise fairly disjointed and abstract considerations.107 This 
Part describes our initial efforts to fill that gap. Our framework 
seeks to capture much of the complexity of human behavior 
while remaining sufficiently simple to generate valuable in-
sights for agencies at each stage in the regulatory process. 
We enrich the current thinking among agencies and legal 
scholars in three ways. First, we add a new line of analysis 
based on the assumption that individuals seek to maximize 
utility not only through wealth or monetary outcomes, but also 
through social outcomes. Second, once we recognize the consid-
eration of social outcomes, a further distinction between ra-
tional and extra-rational naturally follows, just as it does for 
the consideration of monetary outcomes. We specify the consid-
erations for determining when individuals are likely to engage 
in extra-rational action under both assumptions, noting a con-
siderable degree of symmetry. In this way, we are able to build 
a set of complementary considerations for proceeding logically 
through both sorts of analyses. Finally, we demonstrate that 
rational and extra-rational considerations should be analyzed 
for different populations—individual, household, local commu-
nity, and so on. If individuals respond differently when they act 
independently rather than as a part of a larger group, agencies 
should consider a decision in terms of the range of influences 
that it is likely to exert and the range of behavioral responses 
that it is likely to elicit. 
 
 105. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 5, at 1.  
 106. See, e.g., id. (noting OMB recommendation to agencies to consider 
“behaviorally informed approaches to regulation”); 2010 OIRA Disclosure 
Memo, supra note 5, at 2–12 (providing guidance to agencies). 
 107. Cf. Adler, supra note 20, at 142–43 (noting the importance of bounded 
rationality for regulatory decisionmakers); Jolls et al., supra note 2, at 1508–
45 (providing a general framework for use of behavioral economics in devel-
opment of legal prescriptions).  
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A. UPDATING THE RATIONALITY AND MONETARY OUTCOME 
ASSUMPTIONS 
The analytical framework we develop begins to address the 
problem that regulatory decisionmakers have limited time and 
resources available to identify desired outcomes and to under-
stand the regulatory influences on the behavior of regulatory 
targets.108 Our framework starts with the assumptions that in-
dividuals seek to maximize utility when considering both 
wealth or monetary outcomes and social outcomes. It then 
splits each assumption into two prongs based on whether the 
individual is likely to engage in rational or extra-rational deci-
sionmaking. We diagram the analytical framework in Figure 1. 
Although our framework is not designed to yield a simple, 
quantitative outcome about the most desirable regulatory ap-
proach, it will enable agencies to engage in a more complete 
analysis of the influences on behavior. 
 
Figure 1. Analytical Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Monetary Outcomes 
a. Rational Action  
Although utility maximization in theory may include “eve-
rything that an individual might value,”109 nonmonetary fac-
 
 108. See Adler, supra note 20, at 155–57. 
 109. LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 18 
(2002). 
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tors are difficult to account for; thus, in practice the regulatory 
analysis often focuses largely on wealth or monetary out-
comes.110 A vast literature explores this approach, and we do 
not seek to contribute to that literature here. In this section, we 
emphasize the importance of not assuming that the target pop-
ulation has adequate information across a number of regulato-
ry domains. 
 i. Inaccurate Information 
Individuals often fail to act in classically self-interested 
ways because of incomplete or inaccurate information. For ex-
ample, individuals list saving money as a primary reason for 
their decisions about when and how long to idle their vehicle; 
however, the average individual also believes she should idle 
for over 4 minutes before it becomes cost-effective to turn off 
the vehicle.111 In fact, the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) recommends idling for no more than thirty seconds to 
save gas, and to prevent vehicle wear and tear.112 In many cas-
es, agency officials have implemented policy mechanisms to en-
sure access to accurate and up-to-date information, such as the 
institution of labeling requirements or hazard warnings.113 In 
other cases, however, agency officials have underestimated or 
overlooked the knowledge deficits that exist and therefore 
missed opportunities for lower cost, more effective, and less in-
vasive regulations. For example, campaigns to update idling be-
liefs in multiple communities have resulted in idling reductions 
on the order of thirty percent.114 Updating beliefs about idling 
may be far less expensive and far more politically viable than 
direct regulation of driving behavior or increasing the price of 
gasoline.115 Moreover, in some cases a price mechanism should 
 
 110. See Adler, supra note 20, at 158–59; Scott, supra note 55, at 1621–22. 
 111. Amanda R. Carrico et al., Costly Myths: An Analysis of Idling Beliefs 
and Behavior in Personal Motor Vehicles, 37 ENERGY POL’Y 2881, 2885 (2009).  
 112. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, YOUR CAR AND CLEAN AIR: WHAT YOU 
CAN DO TO REDUCE POLLUTION 3 (1994), available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
OMS/consumer/18-youdo.pdf. 
 113. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption By Preamble: Federal Agencies 
and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227, 230 (2007) (dis-
cussing mandatory agency safety requirements such as “product performance, 
design, labeling, warnings, and instructions”). 
 114. MCKENZIE-MOHR ASSOCS., ANTI-IDLING FINAL REPORT 4 (2003), 
available at http://www.greatersudbury.ca/content/earthcare/documents/Sudbury_ 
finalreport.pdf. 
 115. OIRA recently described these types of informational regulatory tools 
as “summary disclosure.” 2010 OIRA Disclosure Memo, supra note 5, at 3–6 
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be combined with information to be effective. Increasing the 
cost of gasoline, for example, will not reduce gas use or carbon 
emissions from idling if individuals believe they should idle far 
longer than necessary to save gas and money. Of course, where 
barriers such as cost, access, or convenience prevent an indi-
vidual from adopting a behavior, education is often necessary 
but not sufficient.  
 ii. Insufficient Information 
In addition to outdated or incorrect beliefs, surveys reveal 
large knowledge deficits regarding opportunities for household 
energy efficiency.116 Because the breakdown of how energy is 
used in the home is generally invisible to homeowners, con-
sumers often have little idea where the opportunities for effi-
ciency and conservation exist.117 This problem has been analo-
gized to the situation a shopper would face if a grocery store did 
not list prices on each item and only provided a total, non-
itemized bill at the time of check-out.118 Not surprisingly, con-
sumers overemphasize the impact of curtailment behaviors 
(i.e., turning off lights and appliances), which are often more 
visible in the consumer’s mind, and underemphasize the impact 
of efficiency upgrades.119 
Information in the form of real-time feedback can recouple 
specific behaviors with their associated energy costs, giving 
consumers more information about which appliances and be-
haviors have the greatest effect on their monthly energy bills. 
As discussed above, estimates suggest that home energy meters 
 
(identifying the seven principles for agency use of summary disclosure as a 
regulatory tool). It may be important not only to provide more information, but 
also to attend to the way in which the information is provided. Jolls et al., su-
pra note 2, at 1533–34. 
 116. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 91, at 36–37 (citing studies that 
show that most energy users are ill informed of appliance energy usage under 
aggregate billing systems). 
 117. Id. at 36 (explaining how energy bills are received infrequently and 
aggregate energy use into one total). 
 118. See id. at 36–38; Willett Kempton & Laura Montgomery, Folk Quanti-
fication of Energy, 7 ENERGY 817, 817 (1982). OIRA recently recognized that 
agencies “should take steps to provide people with relevant information when 
they are actually making the decision or taking the action in question.” 2010 
OIRA Disclosure Memo, supra note 5, at 4 (stating that Principle Four is that 
“[d]isclosed information should be properly placed and timed”). 
 119. Shahzeen Z. Attari et al., Public Perceptions of Energy Consumption 
and Savings, 107 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 16,054, at 16,055 (2010); Willett 
Kempton et al., Do Consumers Know “What Works” in Energy Conservation?, 9 
MARRIAGE FAM. REV. 115, 115–33 (1985).  
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can reduce household energy use.120 In a 1979 study, McClel-
land and Cook installed monitors in a group of households that 
displayed the home’s energy usage in terms of cents per hour. 
These households reduced energy use by twelve percent rela-
tive to a control group over the course of an eleven-month pe-
riod.121 Similarly, product-integrated feedback displays, such as 
those that provide real-time fuel economy data in vehicles, have 
been associated with roughly a ten-percent improvement in ve-
hicle fuel economy due to changes in driving habits.122 Regula-
tory approaches that assume that price is the only meaningful 
influence on behavior may miss the opportunity to achieve 
those ten- to fifteen-percent gains simply through feedback. If 
the assumption is that price changes or direct regulation of the 
timing or amount of household electricity use are necessary, 
the resulting policies may generate a public backlash such as 
the one that defeated the initial smart meter proposal in Mary-
land.123 In short, for individuals who lack adequate informa-
tion, the behavioral literature may enable regulators to develop 
successful near-term approaches that they would otherwise 
miss. 
b. Extra-Rational Action 
The notion that individuals sometimes seek to maximize 
wealth or monetary outcomes but do so in extra-rational ways 
accounts for many of the insights of behavioral economics. To 
ensure that these insights are adequately reflected in regulato-
ry analysis, scholars have translated information from a broad 
range of studies into key findings or lessons.124 To assess shifts 
 
 120. See ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INST., RESIDENTIAL ELECTRICITY USE 
FEEDBACK: A RESEARCH SYNTHESIS AND ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK 2–5 (2009) 
(reviewing studies on various forms of monitoring and feedback for home 
energy consumers); Abrahamse et al., supra note 88, at 278 (same). 
 121. Lou McClelland & Stuart W. Cook, Energy Conservation Effects of 
Continuous In-Home Feedback in All-Electric Homes, 9 J. ENVTL. SYS. 169, 
169–73 (1979). 
 122. See Jack N. Barkenbus, Eco-Driving: An Overlooked Climate Change 
Initiative, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 762, 765–66 (2010) (showing a ten-percent gain in 
fuel economy); Mascha van der Voort et al., A Prototype of Fuel-Efficiency 
Support Tool, 9 C. TRANSP. RES. 279, 279 (2001) (showing a sixteen-percent 
gain); Press Release, Scania Grp., Scania Takes Eco-Driving to a New Level 
with Its Latest Digital Performance Coaching Technology (Sept. 17, 2009), 
available at http://www.scania.com/media/pressreleases/n09025en.aspx. 
 123. See Behr, supra note 96. 
 124. See, e.g., ARIELY, supra note 2, at xxix–xxx; Rabin, supra note 2, at 
13–32; Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 63, at 452. 
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in the willingness of individuals to alter their behavior in re-
sponse to a price increase or signal, a regulator can incorporate 
these findings or lessons, asking whether the type of targeted 
behavior reflects the type of conditions under which individuals 
have been demonstrated to depart from traditional rationality 
assumptions. The regulator can then adjust recommendations 
to address these extra-rational responses. We gather some of 
these core findings or lessons here. 
 i. Hyperbolic Discounting 
Despite an attractive return on investment that follows the 
purchase of many efficient products and appliances, such as 
those carrying the Energy Star label, consumers have shown a 
tendency to undervalue the savings associated with reduced 
operating costs.125 Some have argued that this may be attri-
buted to uncertainties in the consumer’s mind about the ex-
pected savings of the product or future energy costs;126 howev-
er, there is also evidence that individuals simply overlook 
operating costs altogether when not prompted to consider 
them127 or miscalculate potential savings when they do.128 Re-
search in the social and behavioral sciences suggests that well-
designed information, particularly when provided at the point 
of decisionmaking, can help to overcome steep discount rates or 
 
 125. See Kenneth Gillingham et al., Energy Efficiency Economics and Poli-
cy, 1 ANN. REV. RESOURCE ECON. 597, 605–07 (2009); Jerry A. Hausman, Indi-
vidual Discount Rates and the Purchase and Utilization of Energy-Using Dur-
ables, 10 BELL J. ECON. 33, 50 (1979); Richard Howarth & Alan H. Sanstad, 
Discount Rates and Energy Efficiency, 13 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 101, 101 
(1995); Jonathan G. Koomey & Alan H. Sanstad, Technical Evidence for As-
sessing the Performance of Markets Affecting Energy Efficiency, 22 ENERGY 
POL’Y 826, 828–30 (1994); Peter Kooreman, Individual Discounting, Energy 
Conservation, and Household Demand for Lighting, 18 RESOURCE & ENERGY 
ECON. 103, 112 (1996). 
 126. See Adam B. Jaffe et al., The Economics of Energy Efficiency, in 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENERGY 79, 85–86 (Cutler Cleveland ed., 2004); Ronald J. 
Sutherland, Market Barriers to Energy-Efficiency Investments, 12 ENERGY J. 
15, 31 (1991).  
 127. See Daniel C. Feiler & Jack B. Soll, A Blind Spot in Driving Decisions: 
How Neglecting Costs Puts Us in Overdrive, 98 CLIMATIC CHANGE 285, 289 
(2010); Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology, 
105 COLUM. L. REV. 405, 444–45 (2005). 
 128. See Willet Kempton et al., I Always Turn It on “Super”: User Decisions 
About When and How to Operate Room Air Conditioners, 18 ENERGY & 
BUILDINGS 177, 189–90 (1992); Kempton & Montgomery, supra note 118, at 826.  
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may prime the individual to consider operating costs when 
making decisions about product purchase and use.129 
 ii. Cognitive Costs 
An often overlooked but important example of a departure 
from rationality—at least as to monetary outcomes—is the re-
markably high value that individuals place on cognitive 
costs.130 Traditional rational-actor models tend to underesti-
mate the cognitive costs of seeking out and evaluating informa-
tion, as well as the cognitive benefit of avoiding hassles. Yet, 
the convenience of an action stands out as a primary predictor 
of whether an individual chooses to adopt it. For example, re-
gardless of an individual’s environmental values and beliefs, 
the availability of curbside recycling is the single strongest 
predictor of whether a household recycles.131 Similarly, re-
searchers have found that simply relocating recycling bins a 
few feet inside of a room, rather than outside the door, can de-
crease the number of aluminum cans thrown in the conven-
tional trash by half.132 It is probably for this reason that indi-
viduals so often revert to the status quo when making 
decisions. A good illustration of this can be found in rates of or-
gan donation. The proportion of the population consenting to 
donate their organs is roughly sixty percent higher in countries 
that use an opt-out policy (where the default option is a consent 
to donate) rather than an opt-in policy as it is in the United 
States (where the default option is not to donate). The margin 
of difference in actual organ donation is substantially smaller, 
but it remains sixteen percent higher in the presence of an opt-
out policy.133 
 
 129. Feiler & Soll, supra note 127, at 289.  
 130. OIRA recently recognized the importance of considering cognitive 
costs during regulatory development. See 2010 OIRA Disclosure Memo, supra 
note 5, at 4, 10 (noting that “[p]eople have limited time and attention” and 
thus “may not participate in important programs simply because the required 
steps for participation are complex and daunting; agencies can often improve 
outcomes by reducing unnecessary paperwork burdens and simplifying choices”). 
 131. Glenda Wall, Barriers to Individual Environmental Action: The Influ-
ence of Attitudes and Social Experiences, 32 CANADIAN REV. SOC. & 
ANTHROPOLOGY 465, 477 (1995). 
 132. Timothy D. Ludwig et al., Increasing Recycling in Academic Buildings: 
A Systematic Replication, 31 J. APPLIED BEHAV. ANALYSIS 683, 683 (1998). 
 133. Eric J. Johnson & Daniel Goldstein, Do Defaults Save Lives?, 302 
SCIENCE 1338, 1339 (2003). OIRA recently included default settings among 
the alternatives that agencies should consider when designing regulatory op-
tions. 2010 OIRA Disclosure Memo, supra note 5, at 9 (noting that regulatory 
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Policies and programs that recognize the importance of 
convenience to individuals, despite the attractiveness of the op-
tions at stake, have greater chances of success. For example, 
home efficiency rebate programs that require the extra step of a 
home energy audit to be eligible to participate are less success-
ful than those that do not.134 Similarly, programs that simplify 
the process for collecting benefits are also likely to encourage 
greater levels of participation.135 Imposing paperwork burdens 
to ensure accountability may unintentionally dissuade partici-
pation, thereby reducing the program’s overall effectiveness. 
For example, although the environmental impacts of the Con-
sumer Assistance to Recycle and Save Act136 (CARS, more 
commonly known as Cash for Clunkers) have been criticized,137 
from a behavioral standpoint it was a resounding success. In 
addition to other factors such as an attractive incentive pack-
age138 and a highly visible marketing campaign, the CARS pro-
gram offered an instantaneous rebate139 and placed the paper-
work burden on the car industry rather than the consumer.140 
One can compare this to state incentive programs to install 
photovoltaics (PV) in households, where consumers must grap-
ple with competing technical requirements depending on the 
state or utility, as well as the complex task of selling certifi-
cates to collect their incentives.141 Not surprisingly, consumer 
 
outcomes “sometimes . . . can be achieved by selecting appropriate starting 
points or ‘default rules’”). 
 134. Paul C. Stern, Information, Incentives, and Proenvironmental Con-
sumer Behavior, 22 J. CONSUMER POL’Y. 461, 469 (1999). 
 135. Paul C. Stern et al., The Effectiveness of Incentives for Residential 
Energy Conservation, 10 EVALUATION REV. 147, 159 (1986) [hereinafter Stern 
et al., Effectiveness of Incentives]; Paul C. Stern, Gerald T. Gardner, Michael 
P. Vandenbergh, Thomas Dietz & Jonathan M. Gilligan, Design Principles for 
Carbon Emissions Reduction Programs, 44 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 4847, 4848 
(2010) [hereinafter Stern et al., Design Principles]. 
 136. 49 U.S.C. § 32901 (2010).  
 137. See, e.g., Lee Schipper, Op-Ed., When It Comes to Being Green, Cash 
for Clunkers Is a Lemon, WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ 
content/graphic/2009/08/08/GR2009080802658.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2010). 
 138. See 49 U.S.C. § 32901(b). 
 139. See id. 
 140. See id. § 32901(c)–(d). 
 141. See Michael P. Vandenbergh et al., Implementing the Behavioral 
Wedge: Designing and Adopting Effective Carbon Emissions Reduction Pro-
grams, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,547, at 10,551 (2010). 
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responses to these programs reflect the differences in cognitive 
costs imposed on the consumer.142 
 iii. Framing 
Although traditional rational-actor models typically as-
sume that individuals hold a stable set of preferences, work 
within social psychology and behavioral economics suggests 
that preferences can be heavily dependent on the context in 
which choices are presented to the individual.143 For example, 
the average individual claims to prefer a hamburger that is de-
scribed as “75% lean” more than one described as “25% fat.”144 
In many cases, frames elicit known systematic deviations from 
rationality. For example, Kahnemann and Tversky demon-
strated the tendency for losses to loom larger than gains where 
individuals assign a higher subjective value to an amount that 
is to be lost rather than an amount that is to be gained.145 For 
this reason, framing an efficiency investment as an opportunity 
to avoid losses, rather than to achieve gains (as it is more typi-
cally framed), is likely to induce more to invest. For regulators, 
understanding how frames influence individuals’ perceptions of 
costs and benefits may assist them in devising more effective 
policies and programs, particularly those involving public edu-
cation.  
2. Social Outcomes 
The second assumption of our analytical framework ac-
counts in a systematic way for insights about the importance of 
social outcomes from research in social psychology, sociology, 
and behavioral economics. We describe this line of analysis be-
low. From a procedural perspective, our best thinking is that an 
agency would consider social outcomes after examining mone-
tary outcomes. 
 
 142. For a more detailed review, see Stern et al., Design Principles, supra 
note 135, at 4847–48. 
 143. See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 2, at 343–44; Tversky & 
Kahneman, supra note 63, at 453. OIRA recently noted the need for agencies 
to consider framing and loss aversion in the design of summary disclosure 
regulatory measures. See 2010 OIRA Disclosure Memo, supra note 5, at 4 (“[I]f 
a potential outcome is presented as a loss, for example, people may pay more 
attention than if it is presented as a gain.”). 
 144. Irwin P. Levin & Gary J. Gaeth, How Consumers Are Affected by the 
Framing of Attribute Information Before and After Consuming the Product, 15 
J. CONSUMER RES. 374, 375–77 (1988). 
 145. See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 2, at 342; Tversky & Kahneman, 
supra note 63, at 456. 
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Before we begin, we note that our description of extra-
rational responses to social outcome maximization is necessari-
ly tentative because less research exists concerning such re-
sponses. A possible reason is that the category has been largely 
overlooked. Because social psychologists and sociologists often 
use an expansive definition of rationality, they tend to mute 
somewhat the idea of extra-rational responses.146 Similarly, 
economists often examine extra-rational behavior, but they 
tend to focus on monetary outcomes, rather than social out-
comes.147 Thus, consideration of extra-rational responses to so-
cial outcome maximization, though suggested by existing re-
search, has largely fallen through the cracks. 
In addition, we recognize that social outcomes are highly 
subjective and difficult to define, and that it is difficult to dis-
tinguish between rational and extra-rational behavior within 
this category. For example, social outcomes could be broadened 
to include the experience of psychological well-being that is as-
sociated with helping another, therefore making it rational for 
the individual to engage in seemingly self-sacrificial behavior 
with no direct social reward (e.g., making an anonymous dona-
tion). Some psychologists have taken this approach.148 We do 
not intend to dismiss or oversimplify this issue, but it is not 
necessary to resolve it to offer regulators a tool for incorporat-
ing broader considerations of social outcomes into regulatory 
analysis. Toward this end, we define a social outcome as a so-
cial reward or punishment.149 So defined, social outcomes in-
 
 146. See, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 63, at 453 (“The definition 
of rationality has been much debated, but there is general agreement that ra-
tional choices should satisfy some elementary requirements of consistency and 
coherence.”). 
 147. See, e.g., id. at 454. 
 148. See, e.g., Robert B. Cialdini et al., Empathy-Based Helping: Is It Self-
lessly or Selfishly Motivated?, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 749, 749–
50 (1987) (arguing that the empathy for another in need leads to the expe-
rience of sadness in the observer, motivating him or her to relieve that sadness 
through helping, and providing data to suggest that empathy is associated 
with sadness and those who were led to believe that helping would not reduce 
empathy were less likely to help others). 
 149. See Howard Margolis, Free Riding Versus Cooperation, in STRATEGY 
AND CHOICE 84, 90 (Richard J. Zeckhauser ed., 1991) (“[T]he possibilities 
. . . could come either from imposing a risk of punishment on those who fail to 
cooperate or offering the promise of reward for those who do.”); cf. Jon Elster, 
Social Norms and Economic Theory, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1989, at 99, 100 
(noting that social norms are “enforced by members of the general community” 
and are “sustained by the approval and disapproval of others” and providing 
several examples). 
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clude the expectation of negative social attention on the basis of 
beliefs about what is typical or approved of within a group.150 
They also include social status that one achieves through en-
gaging in behaviors that have symbolic significance within a 
group.151 We believe that many regulators will find this defini-
tion intuitively appealing, even if they currently lack the in-
formation and framework to incorporate these behavioral ten-
dencies into regulatory analysis. Providing an initial 
framework is our main goal here. Below we identify the types of 
factors that regulators should consider.  
Because the extra-rational social outcome category flows 
from existing research, we believe that it must be included in 
any thorough framework for analyzing behavioral effects, even 
if necessarily tentative. We hope that including it in the 
framework will draw attention to the potential importance of 
this area and the need for further research.152 
a. Rational Action 
To analyze rational decisionmaking as to social outcome 
maximization, we draw together various insights from the liter-
ature. As with our discussion of rational action in pursuit of 
wealth maximization,153 we begin here with a phenomenon that 
arises from a lack of information or misinformation. In this 
case, we examine behavioral insights on how misinformation 
regarding others’ behavior can affect the behavior of those who 
are seeking to maximize social outcomes. We also demonstrate 
how these insights can lead to regulatory innovations.  
 i. Inadequate Information—Pluralistic Ignorance 
Individuals sometimes modify their behavior on the basis 
of an expected social reward or sanction that rests on misin-
formation about what others do or what they value. For exam-
ple, pluralistic ignorance describes the situation in which the 
majority of individuals within a group publicly accept a social 
 
 150. See Margolis, supra note 149, at 90–95. 
 151. See, e.g., ROBERT M. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 146–
54 (1984) (discussing the roles of labels, hierarchies, stereotypes, and 
reputation). 
 152. Cf. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 21, at 1116 (noting how the use 
of a legal analytical framework identified the overlooked importance of an en-
titlement in the case of a polluter protected by a liability rule). 
 153. See supra notes 109–45 and accompanying text. 
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norm that they privately reject.154 It is the incorrect perception 
that the majority of those around them personally accept the 
norm that leads to the perpetuation of the norm.155 Ultimately, 
this motivates a behavioral response that is consistent with a 
widely rejected value.156 Pluralistic ignorance is thought to con-
tribute to socially undesirable behavior in a number of do-
mains.157 For example, college students report the belief that 
the majority of other students on campus believe that heavy 
drinking is considered acceptable and is a common behavior on 
campus.158 In reality, students tend to overestimate the amount 
of drinking that their peers actually engage in.159 The illusion 
of descriptive and injunctive norms for drinking has been 
shown to be related to actual drinking behavior on campuses, 
and interventions to promote a more accurate norm have been 
shown to reduce drinking on campuses.160 
 ii. Descriptive Norms 
Numerous social psychological studies have found that in-
dividuals often follow the crowd in the absence of strong prefer-
ences that direct them otherwise. In his classic study, Solomon 
Asch demonstrated that seventy-five percent of participants 
were willing to volunteer an obviously incorrect response to a 
simple question so as not to deviate from the consensus re-
sponse within the group.161 Consistent with this finding, psy-
chologists have revealed that calling attention to common be-
haviors within a population (a descriptive norm) will induce 
 
 154. DANIEL KATZ & FLOYD HENRY ALLPORT, STUDENTS’ ATTITUDES 152–
53 (1931). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. In addition to the example of college drinking that follows, social 
scientists have speculated that pluralistic ignorance was responsible for the 
widespread public support for segregation among white Americans during the 
1960’s, Hubert J. O’Gorman, Pluralistic Ignorance and White Estimates of 
White Support for Racial Segregation, 39 PUB. OPINION Q. 313, 330 (1975), as 
well as the support of communism within the Soviet Union, TIMUR KURAN, 
PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES 118–27 (1995). 
 158. Deborah A. Prentice & Dale T. Miller, Pluralistic Ignorance and Alco-
hol Use on Campuses: Some Consequences of Misperceiving the Social Norm, 
64 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 243, 245 (1993); Christine M. Schroeder 
& Deborah A. Prentice, Exposing Pluralistic Ignorance to Reduce Alcohol Use 
Among College Students, 28 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2150, 2170–74 (1998). 
 159. Schroeder & Prentice, supra note 158, at 2170–74. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Asch, supra note 62, at 181–82. 
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other individuals to also adopt that behavior.162 For example, in 
two large-scale evaluations conducted in Sacramento and the 
Puget Sound area, researchers randomly selected customers of 
electric utilities to receive periodic peer feedback reports. These 
reports included a bar graph displaying the customer’s recent 
monthly electricity use compared to a group of comparable 
neighbors as well as “efficient neighbors.”163 Individuals who 
received these reports used one to two percent less energy than 
those that did not. These savings persisted up to a year after 
the intervention was initiated.164 Interestingly, households that 
used less than their efficient peers showed a slight increase in 
energy use, referred to as a “boomerang effect,”165 reinforcing 
the impact of descriptive norms.  
Although logical on the surface, this psychological principle 
flies against the instincts of many who develop programs to 
change behavior.166 Messages are often designed to convey the 
scale of the problem by bringing attention to an undesirable 
behavior. For example, a public education campaign designed 
to reduce drunk driving may reference the hundreds of thou-
sands of Americans pulled over for drunk driving each year. By 
doing this, however, a campaign may promote the belief that 
 
 162. Noah J. Goldstein et al., A Room with a Viewpoint: Using Social 
Norms to Motivate Environmental Conservation in Hotels, 35 J. CONSUMER 
RES. 472, 479–80 (2008) (finding that prescriptive norms increased participa-
tion in hotel energy conservation programs); P. Wesley Schultz, Changing Be-
havior With Normative Feedback Interventions: A Field Experiment on Curb-
side Recycling, 21 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 25, 31–33 (1998) 
[hereinafter Schultz, Changing Behavior] (finding that individual feedback in-
creased curbside recycling); P. Wesley Schultz et al., The Constructive, De-
structive, and Reconstructive Power of Social Norms, 18 PSYCHOL. SCI. 429, 
432 (2007) [hereinafter Schultz et al., Power of Social Norms] (finding that 
providing residents with normative feedback decreased home energy usage). 
 163. Ian Ayres et al., Evidence from Two Large Field Experiments that Peer 
Comparison Feedback Can Reduce Residential Energy Usage 5 (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15,386, 2009), available at http://www 
.nber.org/papers/w15386. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id.; see also Robert B. Cialdini et al., A Focus Theory of Normative 
Conduct: A Theoretical Refinement and Reevaluation of the Role of Norms in 
Human Behavior, 24 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 202, 208–09 
(1991) (noting the perverse side effect of an antilittering campaign that impli-
citly acknowledged that many people litter). 
 166. Cf. Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of 
Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 340 (1997) (citing law and economics research 
that acknowledges the occasional trumping power of internalized norms over 
external incentives); Posner, supra note 69, at 1781 (acknowledging the role of 
internalized norms in tax compliance). 
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the behavior, though undesirable, is widespread. For example, 
Arizona’s Petrified Forest National Park estimated that over a 
ton of petrified wood was stolen from their park per month.167 
In response to this problem they placed signs throughout the 
park reading: “Your heritage is being vandalized every day by 
theft losses of petrified wood of 14 tons a year, mostly a small 
piece at a time.”168 By doing this, the park was inadvertently 
encouraging theft by communicating the idea that defection is 
the norm and that one will be in the minority by adopting the 
desirable behavior. When the sign was changed to simply com-
municate that removing wood is undesirable (an injunctive 
norm) rates of theft declined from eight percent to just under 
two percent.169 
 iii. The Attitude-Behavior Gap 
Despite the large amount of attention given to attitudes in 
behavioral research, attitudes tend to be relatively poor predic-
tors of behavior.170 Attitudes often correlate well with inten-
tions to act a certain way; however, there are a host of physical, 
structural, and psychological barriers that may prevent people 
from acting the way that they feel. For example, individuals 
may strongly value health and fitness, but these feelings may 
be overcome by competing influences such as time constraints, 
the availability of healthy food options, and socio-cultural fac-
tors that may influence food preferences and options. For these 
reasons, marketing a behavior is very different from marketing 
a product. Successful behavior-change interventions must take 
a systematic approach to understanding the barriers that pre-
vent an individual from acting on his or her intentions.171 In 
cases where the primary barriers include a lack of awareness or 
actionable knowledge, a well-crafted education campaign may 
be sufficient to promote behavior change. More often than not, 
however, social marketing must go beyond informational ap-
proaches to also target issues such as convenience, access, safe-
 
 167. Robert B. Cialdini, Crafting Normative Messages to Protect the Envi-
ronment, 12 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 105, 107 (2003). 
 168. Id.  
 169. Id. 
 170. See, e.g., Icek Ajzen, The Theory of Planned Behavior, 50 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 179, 180 (1991) (not-
ing the relatively poor predictive power of dispositions as well as general atti-
tudes in predicting specific behaviors). 
 171. See MCKENZIE-MOHR & SMITH, supra note 6, at 122–32. 
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ty, or psychological barriers such as perceptions of efficacy and 
control.172 
 iv. Motivational Crowding 
By focusing solely on wealth or monetary outcome maximi-
zation, agency officials can inadvertently crowd out rational 
processes of social utility maximization that could work in their 
favor. For example, a group of Israeli day care centers found 
that when they introduced a fine to prevent parents from arriv-
ing late to pick up their children, the number of late parents 
nearly doubled.173 Applying an economic cost or benefit to a de-
cision that is otherwise governed by moral or injunctive norms 
can change the subjective payoff structure, thereby reducing in-
trinsic motivation in lieu of external or economic motivation.174 
In other words, the parents in the Israeli day care example 
were more willing to incur the economic cost of arriving late 
than the social cost of inconveniencing the day care instruc-
tors.175  
Agency officials should be careful to avoid introducing eco-
nomic incentives or penalties to change behaviors that may al-
ready be governed by injunctive norms. For example, littering 
in public parks or choosing to water one’s lawn during a 
drought may be more influenced by appeals to social responsi-
bility than by a threat of fines that, in many cases, are insuffi-
ciently large or are difficult to enforce. When economic incen-
tives are deemed appropriate, regulators also should consider 
reinforcing injunctive norms surrounding the target behavior 
through other avenues. Studies suggest a synergistic effect 
when incentives or fines are paired with a public education 
campaign to reinforce the moral case for engaging in a behav-
ior.176 Anecdotal evidence of this can be seen in the response to 
 
 172. Id. 
 173. See Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 3–8 (2000). 
 174. See Samuel Bowles, Policies Designed for Self-Interested Citizens May 
Undermine “The Moral Sentiments”: Evidence from Economic Experiments, 
320 SCIENCE 1605, 1609 (2008); Edward L. Deci et al., A Meta-Analytic Review 
of Experiments Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Moti-
vation, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 627, 658–59 (1999); Bruno S. Frey, Motivation as 
a Limit to Pricing, 14 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 635, 658 (1993); Ann E. Tenbrunsel 
& David M. Messick, Sanctioning Systems, Decision Frames, and Cooperation, 
44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 684, 704 (1999). 
 175. See Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 173, at 3–8. 
 176. See LURA CONSULTING, THE CARROT, THE STICK, AND THE COMBO: A 
RECIPE FOR REDUCING VEHICLE IDLING IN CANADIAN COMMUNITIES 6–7 (2005), 
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Ireland’s decision to introduce a modest tax on plastic grocery 
bags paired with an aggressive media campaign.177 The effect 
on plastic bag usage far surpassed the expected cumulative ef-
fects of these policies.178 Within weeks, the use of plastic bags 
dropped by ninety-four percent and the social stigma of being 
seen carrying a plastic bag was likened to that of “wearing a fur 
coat or not cleaning up after a dog.”179 
b. Extra-Rational Action 
Accounting for extra-rational responses to social outcomes 
is an essential area of regulatory analysis, yet one that is large-
ly off the radar screen even for those who recognize the impor-
tance of understanding the role of extra-rational behavior in 
monetary outcome maximization. Studies suggest that many of 
the same types of departures from rationality that afflict mone-
tary outcome maximization also afflict social outcome maximi-
zation.180 Social outcome preferences are context specific, as are 
monetary outcome preferences.181 Individuals have a limited 
ability to process social information, as with monetary informa-
tion.182 Individuals are affected by having committed verbally 
or in writing, even if there is no monetary or social sanction.183 
Of course, individuals also have personal norms that sometimes 
influence behavior in ways that are inconsistent with monetary 
or social outcome maximization.184 For example, within a target 
 
available at http://oee.nrcan.gc.ca/communities-government/transportation/ 
municipal-communities/reports/carrot-stick-combo/carrot-stick-combo.pdf (ad-
vising that both voluntary and regulatory approaches should be used in tan-
dem); David T. Levy et al., The Effects of Tobacco Control Policies on Smoking 
Rates: A Tobacco Control Scorecard, 10 J. PUB. HEALTH MGMT. PRAC. 338, 
346–49 (2004) (“[T]he most successful tobacco control strategies appear to in-
volve multiple policies implemented as part of a comprehensive strategy.”). 
 177. See Rosenthal, supra note 13, at A3. Similarly, combining public edu-
cation with regulatory measures has also been successfully used to reduce ve-
hicle idling in a number of Canadian communities. See LURA CONSULTING, su-
pra note 176, at 8–20.  
 178. See Rosenthal, supra note 13, at A3 (“And then something happened 
that was bigger than the sum of these parts.”). 
 179. Id.  
 180. See infra Parts II.A.2.b.i–iii.  
 181. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.b.i.  
 182. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.b.ii. 
 183. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.b.iii. 
 184. See Susanne Göckeritz et al., Descriptive Normative Beliefs and Con-
servation Behavior: The Moderating Roles of Personal Involvement and Injunc-
tive Normative Beliefs, 40 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 514, 517 (2010) (describing 
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population such as individuals and households, the expected 
utility of an outcome may be a poor predictor of a behavior 
when there are strong injunctive norms associated with an ac-
tion (e.g., littering in a public space), rather than when society 
views a behavior as morally neutral (e.g., idling a vehicle in a 
public space). 
 i. Framing 
Framing yields examples of extra-rational behavior when 
individuals seek to maximize social outcomes. Frames can in-
teract with an individual’s previous experiences or ideological 
worldview to trigger certain responses as they do with an indi-
vidual’s sense of monetary value.185 For example, the term tax 
triggers many negative associations among those who are ideo-
logically conservative that the term offset does not. Conse-
quently, more Republicans (and independents) are willing to 
purchase a more expensive product when its cost is increased 
due to a “carbon offset,” rather than a “carbon tax.”186 In other 
words, individual preferences for monetary wealth over social 
wealth vary depending on the context. Similarly, framing an 
issue in terms of the proposed solutions can affect the perceived 
severity of that problem. For example, liberals tend to perceive 
climate change as more problematic when the solution involves 
environmental regulation rather than when it involves nuclear 
power; the opposite pattern is true of conservatives.187 
Given the way that humans process information using cog-
nitive heuristics and previous experiences as a filter, it is simp-
ly impossible to avoid framing information.188 Instead of at-
tempting to avoid framing effects, regulators should consult 
behavioral scientists when framing information. Regulators 
should be careful to avoid frames that may be polarizing or 
prevent audience members from fully considering an argument 
or policy proposal. Similarly, we should not assume from an ini-
 
the moderating effect of personal involvement on behavioral change and in-
formation processing). 
 185. David J. Hardisty et al., A Dirty Word or a Dirty World? Attribute 
Framing, Political Affiliation, and Query Theory, 21 PSYCHOL. SCI. 86, 88 
(2010); see also 2010 OIRA Disclosure Memo, supra note 5, at 4 (“Agencies 
should be aware of the importance of how information is presented . . . .”).  
 186. Hardisty et al., supra note 185, at 86, 89. 
 187. Dan M. Kahan et al., The Second National Risk and Culture Study 4–
6 (Oct. 3, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1017189. 
 188. See id. at 2, 16. 
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tial negative reaction that the public is unwilling to accept cer-
tain policy measures. Reframing an issue in a way that chal-
lenges preconceived beliefs may stimulate more thoughtful con-
sideration of an issue.  
 ii. Habits 
Psychological research suggests that individuals often be-
have inconsistently with their attitudes or beliefs due to a re-
liance on automatic processing in decisionmaking.189 Psycholo-
gists have hypothesized that many “decisions” actually occur 
outside the range of cognition.190 A habit, in the psychological 
sense, is a behavior that is the result of “automatic cognitive 
processes” due to an “extensive repetition” of that behavior.191 
Additional work suggests that habits often supplement the 
cognitive process of decisionmaking or even override attitudinal 
preferences and normative influences on behavior altogether, 
leading to outcomes that may be in conflict with social outcome 
maximization.192 An understanding of the role of habits is criti-
cal for anticipating the appropriate policy measure to influence 
behavior change. For example, anti-idling laws or public educa-
tion campaigns may be ineffective for segments of the public 
that have been “trained” to idle their vehicles for extended pe-
riods.193 New vehicle technologies such as integrated starter-
generators provide a relatively low-cost technological solution 
 
 189. Ola Svenson, Differentiation and Consolidation Theory of Human De-
cision Making: A Frame of Reference for the Study of Pre- and Post-Decision 
Processes, 80 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 143, 145–46 (1992). 
 190. Id. 
 191. David L. Ronis et al., Attitudes, Decisions, and Habits as Determinants 
of Repeated Behavior, in ATTITUDE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION 213, 219 (An-
thony R. Pratkanis et al. eds., 1989). For a discussion of habits in law and eco-
nomics noting the work of Kenneth Arrow and concluding that habits “can be 
incorporated into a theory by supposing that people choose goods with an eye 
towards minimizing changes in their consumption”, see Jolls et al., supra note 
2, at 1478.  
 192. See Henk Aarts et al., Predicting Behavior from Actions in the Past: 
Repeated Decision Making or a Matter of Habit?, 28 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 
1355, 1358–61 (1998); Michel Laroche et al., The Influence of Culture on Pro-
Environmental Knowledge, Attitudes, and Behavior: A Canadian Perspective, 
23 ADVANCES CONSUMER RES. 196, 196 (1996). 
 193. In the case of motor vehicle idling, it was once considered more cost-
effective to idle for a period of time before driving or while waiting. See Carrico 
et al., supra note 111, at 2882. With improvements in modern fuel-injection 
engines, that is no longer the case. See id. However, many individuals are act-
ing based on outdated information and old habits. See id.  
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that does not rely on the consumer to unlearn or relearn a be-
havior.194 
 iii. Cognitive Dissonance 
Cognitive dissonance refers to the psychological discomfort 
that is felt when a person holds two contradictory ideas or cog-
nitions.195 This principle also extends to an inconsistency be-
tween an attitude or belief and a behavior.196 Therefore, an in-
dividual who values personal health but also regularly smokes 
cigarettes will likely experience a certain level of anxiety over 
this inconsistency.197 Dissonance reduction can be achieved by 
modifying an attitude, belief, or behavior to create consisten-
cy.198 When this is impossible or difficult, individuals will often 
justify the inconsistency through rationalization.199 Therefore, 
continuing with the same example, a smoker may justify his or 
her behavior by downplaying the risks of smoking.200 
Behavior change programs can take advantage of the need 
for consistency by highlighting discrepancies between an indi-
vidual’s attitudes, beliefs, and behavior.201 This is true even 
when one’s behavior is not directly observed. For example, stu-
dents on a college campus that were reminded that they had 
made a commitment to take shorter showers were more likely 
to follow through with their pledge.202 Clearly, it is not feasible 
from a policy perspective to use this approach on a macro level; 
however, studies have shown that simply asking individuals to 
make an upfront commitment can also be an effective way to 
encourage action, particularly when that commitment is made 
publicly.203 This is a principle that fundraising organizations 
 
 194. For a discussion of this technology, see id. at 2887. 
 195. See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 2–3 (1957). 
 196. See id. at 3. 
 197. See id. at 2. 
 198. See id. at 18–23. 
 199. See id. at 2. 
 200. See id.  
 201. See Chris Ann Dickerson et al., Using Cognitive Dissonance to En-
courage Water Conservation, 22 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 841, 852 (1992); 
S.J. Kantola et al., Cognitive Dissonance and Energy Conservation, 69 J. 
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 416, 421 (1984).  
 202. See Dickerson et al., supra note 201, at 841. 
 203. See Richard D. Katzev & Theodore R. Johnson, Comparing the Effects 
of Monetary Incentives and Foot-in-the-Door Strategies in Promoting Residen-
tial Electricity Conservation, 14 J. APPL. SOC. PSYCHOL. 12, 24–25 (1984); Mi-
chael S. Pallak & William Cummings, Commitment and Voluntary Energy 
Conservation, 2 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 27, 27, 29 (1976).  
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have utilized in large numbers.204 Similarly, bringing attention 
to one’s behavior even in the absence of a public commitment 
can also be effective. In the case of environmental policy, feed-
back indicating that an individual can do more to reduce envi-
ronmental harm may induce dissonance among those who val-
ue environmental protection if they cannot otherwise 
rationalize their actions.205 
As we suggest at the beginning of this section, this analysis 
identifies the importance of developing new lines of research 
within social psychology and sociology to complement behavior-
al economics.206 This work should focus on the social outcome 
maximization analog to monetary outcome maximization: Are 
there predictable extra-rationalities in how individuals respond 
to social outcomes? In the meantime, the analysis in this area 
should proceed cautiously and incrementally. 
B. ACCOUNTING FOR MULTIPLE LEVELS OF INFLUENCE 
We have described two lines of analysis based on two dif-
ferent assumptions about individual behavior (the considera-
tion of monetary outcomes and social outcomes) and, within 
each, two types of individual responses (rational and extra-
rational). The analytical framework we have described so far 
incorporates behavioral insights by providing not a mathemati-
cal formula with a quantitative outcome, but a structured set of 
factors that agencies should consider when developing regula-
tory options and should add to the quantitative process when 
conducting regulatory review. But so far the framework sug-
gests that agencies should consider the effect of regulatory ac-
tions on individuals without considering whether their behav-
ior changes when viewed in terms of the groupings that 
subsume them—social networks, local communities, and na-
tional constituencies.207 Drawing on the methodology of social 
 
 204. See Elizabeth G. Warner, Ask the Experts: Monthly Pledge Systems—A 
Fundraising Idea for Nonprofits?, NONPROFIT WORLD, May–June, 1994, 4, 4–5 
(explaining how monthly pledge systems can be easily set up and provide sig-
nificant increases in revenue and core donor involvement).  
 205. See Clive Seligman & John M. Darley, Feedback as a Means of De-
creasing Residential Energy Consumption, 62 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 363, 366–
67 (1977). 
 206. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.b. 
 207. OIRA has recently noted the importance of understanding the effects 
of informational regulatory tools on subpopulations. For example, it has noted 
that with regard to default rules it may be important for agencies to “distin-
guish among, and to suit the diverse situations of, members of the affected 
group. For example, geographic or demographic information (such as age) 
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psychology and sociology, in this section we suggest an addi-
tional round of analysis that accounts for these influences on 
individual behavior. 
Behavioral scientists have relied heavily on socio-ecological 
frameworks (SEF) for organizing the set of influences on indi-
vidual behavior and the interrelationships among these influ-
ences.208 Although not a cohesive model used to make and test 
predictions, SEFs are conceptual and organizational tools that 
can focus regulators on different points of influence on behav-
ior, including but not limited to economic influences. Typically, 
SEFs represent multiple nested layers of influence such as in-
dividual-level factors, community-level factors, and others.209 
The number and specificity of the layers that are represented 
depend on the context within which the SEF is used.210 Agen-
cies can begin with a framework that includes four levels of in-
fluence and expand where appropriate. The four levels include: 
the individual, the immediate social environment (including 
family, friends, and work), the community environment (includ-
ing neighborhoods, cities, and states), and the broader national 
and policy environment. 
A sample SEF specific to the decision to invest in an energy 
efficient product is provided in Figure 2. Factors such as the fi-
nancial capability to purchase a new product as well as the 
need for a new product are included as individual-level factors, 
as are knowledge of product options and beliefs about the im-
portance of efficiency. Factors such as vicarious experiences 
with efficient products (i.e., via a friend or colleague) are 
represented in Level 2, along with social norms regarding ener-
gy efficiency or environmentalism. The presence of vendors that 
sell efficient products, the intermediaries that affect these deci-
 
might be taken into account if it helps to increase the likelihood that the de-
fault rule will be suited to the situations of those to whom it applies.” 2010 
OIRA Disclosure Memo, supra note 5, at 11. 
 208. Socio-ecological frameworks have been relied upon by researchers 
working in the areas of developmental psychology, community psychology, 
health psychology, and public health. See, e.g., URIE BRONFENBRENNER, THE 
ECOLOGY OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (1979) (applying an ecological framework 
to the field of developmental psychology). For an example in public health liter-
ature applying an ecological framework in identifying environmental influ-
ences on physical activity, see James F. Sallis et al., An Ecological Approach to 
Creating Active Living Communities, 27 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 297 (2006). 
 209. See, e.g., BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 208, at 3–4 (describing his 
conceptual framework as “a set of nested structures, each inside the next, like 
a set of Russian dolls”). 
 210. Id. 
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sions, and local policies that may affect these purchases (e.g., 
state efficiency requirements) are included in Level 3. Finally, 
federal policy and the presence of cultural values and norms 
are reflected in Level 4.  
A factor within one level will interact with factors at other 
levels. For example, federal policy, local policy, and peer net-
works will provide relevant information to the consumer about 
his or her decision. Broader societal norms in Level 4 may con-
tradict more group-specific social norms in Level 2 such as the 
potential contradiction between materialism and environmen-
talism. Some factors may interact in synergistic ways such as a 
policy to tax plastic bags which may reinforce a social norm to 
use reusable bags.211  
 
Figure 2. Example of Social Ecological Framework Ap-
plied to Residential Efficiency Investments 
This framework provides a systematic way in which agen-
cies can consider the different levels of influence on behavior 
and can look for opportunities where those influences may be 
convergent and where they may conflict. An agency may recog-
nize, for example, that resources spent on campaigns to pro-
mote public transportation in an effort to reduce ozone pollu-
tion are poorly allocated in communities that have no public 
transportation infrastructure to support such behavior. Assum-
 
 211. See supra notes 177–79 and accompanying text. 
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ing sufficient statutory authority, the agency may decide to al-
locate more funding to infrastructure development or to cam-
paigns that target behaviors that are more malleable such as 
motor vehicle idling, other driving behavior, or vehicle main-
tenance.212 Returning to the example of an energy efficient pur-
chase, an agency may realize that federal programs to offset 
the cost of a more efficient product may be bolstered by a simi-
lar program that incentivizes intermediaries to sell these prod-
ucts, therefore encouraging intermediaries to provide the rele-
vant information regarding the operating costs that are often 
missed due to extra-rational patterns of behavior. An agency 
also may recognize that using a campaign to connect efficient 
purchases to societal goals such as energy security or environ-
mental protection may make social or personal norms more sa-
lient when purchase decisions are made.  
Because regulation is, by its nature, generalized, an agency 
may not be able to take account of responses at all scales. But 
regulatory analysis is incomplete unless it at least considers 
behavioral influences at multiple scales. At a minimum, agen-
cies will be better positioned to prioritize factors that have the 
greatest potential leverage on behavior or that may lead to pol-
icy failures if not addressed. Agencies also will be better posi-
tioned to enlist other regulators, such as state or community-
level entities, to tailor policies and messages in ways that are 
more appropriate for those populations. For example, a public 
education campaign centered on the juxtaposition of energy se-
curity and environmental protection may resonate differently 
in different communities. 
III.  ENERGY EXAMPLES   
In this Part, we illustrate our framework by applying it to 
concrete energy-use examples. We demonstrate how the 
framework will operate and the findings it will yield. We refer 
to energy and environmental studies wherever possible, but we 
also draw on studies from other fields where the research is 
particularly relevant and transferable. We first examine the 
important role that our analytical framework might play in im-
proving regulatory decisionmaking regarding electric cars, and 
 
 212. See, e.g., Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality (CMAQ) Improvement 
Program, FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/ 
cmaqpgs/ (last modified Sept. 22, 2009) (discussing the traffic-grant program, 
which includes guidelines limiting spending to areas such as carpooling that 
have high-technical potential but low-behavioral plasticity). 
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we then turn to tankless water heaters. Although our examples 
are drawn from the energy and environmental contexts, we be-
lieve that other areas of intense regulatory and political con-
cern, such as antitrust, securities fraud, pension benefits, and 
health care, are susceptible to the same sorts of considera-
tions.213 
Some background on the issue of energy use is helpful to 
demonstrate the relevance of behavioral analysis. Regulations 
and policies that reduce energy demand will be a critical com-
ponent of any successful U.S. energy policy or climate mitiga-
tion strategy,214 and the household sector is one of the most 
promising areas for low-cost, prompt reductions in energy use 
and carbon emissions.215 The sector accounts for roughly forty 
percent of U.S. carbon emissions as well as a comparable per-
 
 213. See, e.g., J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Behavioral 
Economics: Observations Regarding Issues That Lie Ahead, Address at the 
Vienna Competition Conference (June 9, 2010), available at http://ftc.gov/ 
speeches/rosch/100609viennaremarks.pdf (discussing the case for using prin-
ciples of behavioral economics in antitrust merger review). For commentary on 
Rosch’s speech, see Geoffrey Manne, Commissioner Rosch’s Really Weak Case 
for “Behavioral Antitrust,” TRUTH ON MARKET (July 16, 2010, 12:46 PM), 
http://truthonthemarket.com/2010/07/16/commissioner-roschs-really-weak-case 
-for-behavioral-antitrust/. See also EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF 
LABOR & IRS, AUTOMATIC ENROLLMENT 401(K) PLANS FOR SMALL BUSINESSES 
3 (Feb. 2010), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/automaticenrollment 
401kplans.pdf (describing incentives for small businesses to switch to auto-
matic enrollment of employees in 401(k) plans, with opt-out provisions); Wil-
liam Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 
1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 26–31 (1988) (identifying status quo bias in 
health insurance purchases); Edmund L. Andrews, Obama Outlines New In-
itiatives Intended to Make It Easier to Save for Retirement, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
6, 2009, at A20, available at 2009 WL 17481341. In this Part, we apply the 
monetary and social prongs of our proposed framework to electric car recharg-
ing and tankless water heater purchases, but in the interest of brevity we do 
not apply a social ecological framework to these actions. 
 214. See Nathan S. Lewis, Powering the Planet, Keynote Speech at the Cal-
ifornia Clean Innovation Conference (May 11, 2007), in 2 ENGINEERING & SCI. 
12, 19 (2007) (“[L]owering demand . . . is going to pay off much sooner than 
clean energy supplies.”); S. Pacala & R. Socolow, Stabilization Wedges: Solving 
the Climate Problem for the Next 50 Years with Current Technologies, 305 
SCIENCE 968, 969 (2004) (“Improvements in efficiency and conservation prob-
ably offer the greatest potential . . . .”). 
 215. See, e.g., FLORIAN BRESSAND ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., 
CURBING GLOBAL ENERGY DEMAND GROWTH: THE ENERGY PRODUCTIVITY 
OPPORTUNITY 57 (2007) (noting that the residential sector provides the “larg-
est energy productivity opportunities” globally); HANNAH CHOI GRANADE ET 
AL., MCKINSEY & CO., UNLOCKING ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 
10 (2009) (“The residential sector . . . offers a slightly disproportionate thirty-
five percent of the end-use efficiency potential.”). 
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centage of total U.S. energy consumption.216 A recent analysis 
concludes that behavioral measures targeting household con-
servation and efficiency could reasonably be expected to reduce 
total U.S. emissions by over seven percent by 2020.217 This 
amount is larger than the total emissions of France and ex-
ceeds the combined emissions from several of the largest-
emitting industrial sectors.218 Additional analyses suggest that 
efficiency and conservation are among the quickest and least 
expensive alternatives available.219 
Although the household sector accounts for roughly forty 
percent of U.S. energy use and carbon dioxide emissions, the 
laws and policies directed at reductions from this sector often 
reflect strong assumptions about the influence of price and thus 
often overlook other influences on behavior. Despite the oppor-
tunity in the household sector and the increasing focus on 
energy efficiency and conservation at the federal, state, and lo-
cal levels,220 recent regulatory and policy efforts are only be-
ginning to tap the potential of this sector. A lack of information 
about the most effective behavior change measures may contri-
bute to a surprising barrier: the tendency to focus on behaviors 
that involve the greatest energy use or carbon emissions (i.e., 
technical potential). Instead, behaviors should be evaluated 
based not only on technical potential, but also behavioral plas-
ticity.221 High technical potential means that modest changes 
 
 216. See Shui Bin & Hadi Dowlatabadi, Consumer Lifestyle Approach to 
U.S. Energy Use and the Related CO2 Emissions, 33 ENERGY POL’Y 197, 197 
(2005); Gerald T. Gardner & Paul C. Stern, The Short List: The Most Effective 
Actions U.S. Households Can Take to Curb Climate Change, 50 ENVIRONMENT, 
no. 5, 2008 at 12, 16; Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne C. Steinemann, The Car-
bon-Neutral Individual, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1673, 1694 (2007). 
 217. Dietz et al., supra note 33, at 18,452. 
 218. Id. at 18,452–53. 
 219. See BRESSAND ET AL., supra note 215, at 57; Allcott & Mullainathan, 
supra note 6, at 1204–05; Michael P. Vandenbergh et al., Individual Carbon 
Emissions: The Low-Hanging Fruit, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1758 (2008).  
 220. For a summary of the household energy efficiency measures in the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 
115, which incorporates the Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008, 
Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3807, see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
GAO-10-383, RECOVERY ACT: PROJECT SELECTION AND STARTS ARE 
INFLUENCED BY CERTAIN FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS AND OTHER FACTORS 
(2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-383. 
 221. See Richard York et al., Bridging Environmental Science with Envi-
ronmental Policy: Plasticity of Population, Affluence, and Technology, 83 SOC. 
SCI. Q. 18, 31 (2002) (“Plasticity is a tool for bridging science with policy.”). 
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in behaviors have a substantial impact.222 High behavioral 
plasticity means that the behaviors are relatively easy to 
change.223 Areas of high technical potential but low plasticity 
are important, but a growing body of research demonstrates 
that many behaviors have high technical potential and high 
behavioral plasticity.224 They should be the initial focus of poli-
cy, and our electric car and tankless water heater examples 
demonstrate the potential for regulators to use behavioral in-
sights to affect these areas.225 
A. ELECTRIC CARS 
The electric car example demonstrates how even early in 
the development of regulations and policies rational action as-
sumptions can begin to frame the regulatory options to exclude 
behavioral insights. The emissions reduction potential and cost 
of operating electric vehicles depend heavily on when individu-
als choose to charge those vehicles.226 Drivers are most likely to 
plug in their vehicles when they return home in the evening.227 
This timing coincides with peak-load energy use in the late af-
ternoon and evening, when less efficient sources of electricity 
generation are used to meet peak load demands.228 Depending 
on the mix of generating sources (coal, nuclear, gas, or renewa-
ble sources), recharging during peak periods may substantially 
increase the carbon emissions and costs associated with electric 
vehicles.229 Recharging during peak periods also could increase 
 
 222. See Vandenbergh et al., supra note 141, at 10,551.  
 223. Too much of the discussion to date has focused on behaviors that have 
high-technical potential but low plasticity, such as shifting from individually 
driven cars to carpooling. See Dietz et al., supra note 33, at 18,453.  
 224. See discussion infra Part III.A and Part III.B. 
 225. Cf. Vandenbergh et al., supra note 141, at 10,551.  
 226. A. ELGOWAINY ET AL., ARGONNE NAT’L LAB. CTR. FOR TRANSP. 
RESEARCH, ENERGY SYS. DIV., WELL TO WHEELS ENERGY USE AND 
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS: ANALYSIS OF PLUG-IN HYBRID ELECTRIC 
VEHICLES 7 (2009) (discussing greenhouse gas emissions). 
 227. RYAN W. MCCARTHY ET AL., UNIV. OF CAL., DAVIS INST. OF TRANSP. 
STUDIES, INTERACTIONS BETWEEN ELECTRIC-DRIVE VEHICLES AND THE 
POWER SECTOR IN CALIFORNIA 7 (2009) (discussing greenhouse gas emissions 
and demand for energy by time of day). 
 228. See ELGOWAINY ET AL., supra note 226, at 7; MCCARTHY ET AL., supra 
note 227, at 7; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., TRANSITIONS 
TO ALTERNATIVE TRANSPORTATION TECHNOLOGIES—PLUG-IN HYBRID ELECTRIC 
VEHICLES 2 (2010) (discussing costs and power transmission capacity). 
 229. See, e.g., BETTINA KAMPMAN ET AL., CE DELFT, GREEN POWER FOR 
ELECTRIC CARS 41–42 (2010) (noting the importance of recharging time for 
capacity and other impacts); K. PARKS ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY 
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the costs and intrusiveness of power lines and other aspects of 
electric transmission systems.230 In short, recharging at the 
most convenient times could make the electric car policy less 
efficient than it would otherwise be, or worse, less efficient 
than other entirely different regulatory choices such as devel-
oping different types of low carbon cars or mass transportation 
systems. If instead agency officials could devise a policy to in-
duce individuals to charge their vehicles during off-peak hours 
(e.g., midnight to 7 a.m.) in many regions of the United States, 
they may increase the environmental benefits of an electric ve-
hicle fleet, decrease the costs, or both. Table 1 identifies regions 
of the country in which efforts to recharge vehicles at night ra-
ther than in the evening may substantially reduce CO2 levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LAB., COSTS AND EMISSIONS ASSOCIATED WITH PLUG-IN HYBRID ELECTRIC 
VEHICLE CHARGING IN THE XCEL ENERGY COLORADO SERVICE TERRITORY 24 
(2007) (concluding that the costs and air pollution emissions of recharging 
plug-in hybrids varies substantially based on the time of charging). 
 230. See, e.g., Smart Grid Policy, 74 Fed. Reg. 13,152, 13,156 (Mar. 26, 
2009) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. ch. 1) (“If charging takes place during peak 
periods it could require a large investment in new generation, demand re-
sponse resources and/or transmission capacity to meet the resulting higher 
peak loads. However, charging off-peak could actually improve the operation 
of the electric system, for example by improving existing generation asset uti-
lization or by providing an electricity storage solution to address the potential 
for over-generation by variable resources in off-peak periods.”). 
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Table 1. Regional Variations in CO2 Emissions from  
Recharging231 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Monetary Outcomes 
a. The Rational Actor 
If regulators assume that individuals are cost-minimizing, 
rational actors, they are likely to arrive at time-of-use pricing 
schemes to increase the cost of on-peak electricity use or to re-
move the choice from the individual by adopting a technology-
based solution that controls the timing of vehicle recharging 
 
 231. Table 1 is based on data presented in STANTON W. HADLEY & 
ALEXANDRA TSVETKOVA, OAK RIDGE NAT’L LAB., POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF 
PLUG-IN HYBRID ELECTRIC VEHICLES ON REGIONAL POWER GENERATION 18–
19, 48–50 (2008). The regions identified in the left-hand column of the table 
are as follows: ECAR—East Central Area Reliability Coordination Agreement; 
ERCOT—Electric Reliability Council of Texas; MAAC—Mid-Atlantic Area 
Council; MAIN—Mid-America Interconnected Network; MAPP—Mid-
Continent Area Power Pool; NPCC-NY—Northeast Power Coordinating Coun-
cil/NY; NPCC-NE—Northeast Power Coordinating Council/New England; 
FRCC—Florida Reliability Coordinating Council; SERC—Southeastern Elec-
tric Reliability Council; SPP—Southwest Power Pool; WECC-NW—Western 
Electricity Coordinating Council/Northwest Power Pool Area; WECC-
RMP/ANM—Western Electricity Coordinating Council/Rocky Mountain Power 
Area and Arizona-New Mexico-Southern Nevada Power Area; WECC-CA—
Western Electricity Coordinating Council/California. See id. at xiv, xvi fig.ES-1 
(noting that the regions are as specified by the Energy Information Adminis-
tration in the Annual Energy Outlook 2007). 
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without regard to the time the vehicle is plugged into the grid. 
Not surprisingly, much of the initial regulatory response to the 
time-of-recharge problem appears to be proceeding along these 
lines.232 Although regulatory policy directed at electric vehicle 
recharging is in the early stages of development and ultimately 
will involve a complex mix of federal, state, and local actions, 
the initial focus appears to be on the use of price and technolo-
gy to steer recharging behavior.233 For example, some early re-
ports on recharging appear to assume that the optimal ap-
proach is simply to increase household electricity prices during 
the evening-peak-use period.234 Other reports discuss new 
technologies that will automatically shift recharging to off-peak 
periods regardless of when the driver plugs the car into the re-
charger.235 
Our framework requires consideration of these options, but 
it does not stop there. Our framework highlights the need for 
regulators to consider whether individuals will have adequate 
information to respond to the prices or new technologies. To 
deal with information problems, regulators may use general 
public information campaigns to educate consumers about var-
iable pricing structures, although these campaigns have had 
limited success.236 Immediate feedback devices and information 
distributed through trusted local sources may be more effective. 
Regulators could require electric vehicle or recharger manufac-
turers to provide a feedback mechanism that indicates the re-
charging cost or cost per unit of electricity on a real-time dis-
play that is visible at the time the vehicle is charged.237 
 
 232. See, e.g., Do You Own an Electric Vehicle (EV)?, S. CAL. EDISON, http:// 
www.sce.com/CustomerService/rates/residential/electric-vehicles.htm (last vis-
ited Nov. 29, 2010) (offering time-of-use rates for electric vehicle users); Resi-
dential Electric Vehicle Services, L.A. DEP’T WATER & POWER, http://www 
.ladwp.com/ladwp/cms/ladwp002056.jsp (last visited Nov. 29, 2010) (offering a 
discounted rate for off-peak electric vehicle charging). 
 233. See, e.g., Do You Own an Electric Vehicle (EV)?, supra note 232 (using 
such a strategy). 
 234. See, e.g., HADLEY & TSVETKOVA, supra note 231, at 23 (concluding 
that “simple time-of-day charging could easily place all end-of-day charging 
requirements into peak periods”). 
 235. See, e.g., id. (noting the potential for “smart chargers”); PARKS ET AL., 
supra note 229, at 8 (discussing use of timing devices to move charging to off-
peak hours).  
 236. Abrahamse et al., supra note 88, at 276–77. 
 237. See id. at 278–81 (discussing the use of immediate feedback on motor 
vehicle and residential energy use).  
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Beyond ensuring that price or technology-based measures 
are workable if selected, our framework opens up the possibility 
of other alternatives. Utility models based on wealth considera-
tions offer a valuable perspective, but an exclusive focus may 
constrain the options to price or technology-based ones. Even 
assuming a first preference for such options, additional alterna-
tives are important for realizing the full potential of electric 
cars, especially if some price- and technology-based measures 
are not politically viable. In fact, there is a substantial risk of 
consumer backlash against higher prices during peak pe-
riods.238 If consumers or voters reject new pricing schemes, ad-
ditional measures will be necessary, although the support for 
regulatory changes and the credibility of regulators at that 
point may be damaged. 
Similarly, consumers have reacted negatively to the loss of 
control associated with some new household technologies thus 
far,239 and similar reactions may occur if the technological op-
tions take control over the timing of recharging out of consum-
ers’ hands. For example, research on programmable thermo-
stats has demonstrated that many individuals prefer the 
manual function and ultimately use less energy when they are 
able to override the automatic setting on a programmable 
thermostat.240 These findings suggest that more nuanced, be-
haviorally sensitive options, such as including override devices 
with rechargers, may have a better chance of succeeding and 
therefore increasing the benefits of electric cars. 
 
 238. See FARUQUI & WOOD, supra note 12, at 21 (suggesting both that con-
sumers are often satisfied after being introduced to variable pricing due to 
greater savings and that greater education prior to implementation may help 
consumers to adopt such pricing schemes); Behr, supra note 96 (discussing 
troubles with recent Maryland variable pricing and its smart meter initiative); 
see also Guy R. Newsham & Brent G. Bowker, The Effect of Utility Time-
Varying Pricing and Load Control Strategies on Residential Summer Peak 
Electricity Use: A Review, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 3289, 3294–95 (2010) (concluding 
that the effectiveness of variable pricing schemes may be improved by target-
ing consumers more likely to respond to such schemes and by offering them 
greater support services).  
 239. Behr, supra note 96 (discussing troubles with even less intrusive 
efforts). 
 240. Kempton et al., supra note 128, at 190; see also Monica J. Nevius & 
Scott Pigg, Programmable Thermostats That Go Berserk? Taking a Social 
Perspective on Space Heating in Wisconsin 8.233, 8.241, Paper presented at 
the American Council for Energy-Efficient Economy Summer Study on Energy 
Efficiency in Buildings: Washington DC (Aug. 23–28, 2000), available at http:// 
www.ecw.org/ecwresults/berserk.pdf (noting that a large proportion of individ-
uals interviewed were not interested in using the programmable features of 
their thermostat, and many considered these features to be a hassle). 
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b. The Extra-Rational Actor 
Using our framework, regulators also would consider the 
research on extra-rational patterns of monetary-outcome-
maximizing behavior early in the regulatory development 
process. For example, individuals may place a remarkably high 
value on convenience and may be willing to pay a higher price 
than expected for the convenience of charging during on-peak 
hours. Due to a tendency to use hyperbolic discounting, indi-
viduals may devalue the savings they will realize in their ener-
gy bills at the end of the month if they recharge at off-peak 
hours.241 To overcome these behavioral tendencies, agencies 
may need to consider requiring the feedback devices and built-
in delayed start mechanisms with the override capabilities dis-
cussed above.242 It also may be valuable to provide information 
on the economic implications of recharging times to new electric 
vehicle owners at the time of the vehicle purchase.243 This in-
formation could reflect the insights of behavioral work on mes-
sage frames to overcome hyperbolic discounting, loss- versus 
gain-frames, and other phenomena. These measures may aug-
ment the effect of the time-of-use pricing and technology 
schemes at low cost, thereby increasing the net benefits of the 
electric car. 
2. Social Outcomes 
a. The Rational Actor 
If regulators focus solely on monetary outcome considera-
tions, however, they may overlook additional means of influen-
cing the time of charging or the use of a built-in delayed start 
mechanism. The social outcome prong of our framework sug-
gests the need to explore additional behavioral insights. In 
short, individuals may be willing to incur the economic cost of 
on-peak charging, but considering the social cost in their deci-
sion will change the payoff structure for many.244 It may be 
possible to design reward programs or disseminate information 
in other ways to enable individuals to signal to their neighbors 
 
 241. Cf. Stern, supra note 46, at 208–09 (discussing empirical studies of 
how consumers implicitly discount future values). 
 242. See Abrahamse et al., supra note 88, at 278–82 (discussing the effec-
tiveness of feedback techniques on behavior). 
 243. See id. at 276–77 (discussing the effectiveness of information to pro-
mote proenvironmental behavior). 
 244. Ayres et al., supra note 163, at 14–15. 
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that they are recharging at low-impact times. Descriptive norm 
influences may then create increased incentives for the desired 
behavior, as individuals respond to the range of reasons why 
individuals tend to act the way others do. Information indicat-
ing that many others have chosen to recharge during off-peak 
periods may induce some to change their behavior even if they 
are not personally concerned about climate change, pollution, 
or recharging costs.245 
The behavioral research (e.g., the Israeli child care study) 
also suggests that regulators should take care about the con-
tent of the information provided in public information cam-
paigns.246 For example, for some subpopulations, providing in-
formation focused solely on price may crowd out other motives 
for recharging at off-peak periods. Making individuals aware of 
the social costs may change the subjective payoff structure for 
individuals who are concerned about issues such as climate 
change and air pollution, particularly those who identify with 
environmental groups.247 If properly targeted, this information 
can reinforce economic measures and may lead to impacts that 
are greater than the sum of their parts. 
b. The Extra-Rational Actor 
In addition, if regulators recognize that individuals some-
times behave in extra-rational ways when considering social 
outcomes, they may incorporate a number of steps into re-
charge-related regulations and policies. For example, they may 
require information to be framed in ways that reduce hyperbol-
ic discounting of the social benefits of reduced carbon and air 
pollution. This may be done by framing social costs and benefits 
in terms of losses rather than gains, or presenting information 
in units that are meaningful to the individual (i.e., presenting 
reduction in carbon emissions in units of equivalent trees 
planted or the equivalent number of vehicles removed from the 
road).248 If the social benefits information is provided or primed 
 
 245. See id. (concluding that such information changed behavior in other 
energy-saving contexts). 
 246. See Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 173, at 15–16 (cautioning that 
the production of information to consumers does not always have the intended 
consequences on behavior). 
 247. See Newsham & Bowker, supra note 238, at 3294–95 (arguing that 
similarly targeted strategies have worked to change the behavior of these 
kinds of people). 
 248. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 63, at 456 (noting that framing 
a problem in terms of loss is more likely to change behavior). 
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at the time of decisionmaking, it may prevent many individuals 
from rationalizing a decision to charge during on-peak hours by 
invoking cognitive dissonance over this behavior. This result 
would be particularly heightened if the individual had pre-
viously committed to charge during off-peak hours, such as at 
the time he or she purchased the vehicle.249 As a result, a pro-
gram that induces new electric car owners to commit to re-
charging at off-peak hours, even if only lightly enforced, may 
have an important effect on behavior. By focusing on individu-
als who have just purchased an electric vehicle, a program also 
may induce individuals to form new habits, including the habit 
of recharging at off-peak hours or using a delayed-start mech-
anism. Encouraging good habits at the time a new behavior is 
adopted may be far easier than seeking to undo old habits later.  
B. TANKLESS WATER HEATERS 
Our second case study involves the analysis of policies de-
signed to induce individuals to purchase more efficient ap-
pliances. We consider the purchase of a tankless water heater 
(TWH) here. As with the electric car example, the TWH exam-
ple enables us to evaluate nearly every aspect of our framework 
and to do so in the order that we envision.  
1. Monetary Outcomes 
a. The Rational Actor 
Assuming a rational actor who considers only monetary 
outcomes, the most viable policy approach may be to offset the 
cost of the purchase of a TWH via tax rebates or low-interest 
loans. Indeed, this approach is likely to increase adoption 
among eligible households, and participation rates are likely to 
increase as the size of the incentive increases.250 The behavioral 
literature emphasizes the importance of considering the infor-
mation barriers and beliefs that may prevent an individual 
from participating in the program and ultimately purchasing a 
TWH.251 Individuals must be aware of TWHs as a substitute for 
traditional water heaters, they must be aware of this at the 
 
 249. See Abrahamse et al., supra note 88, at 275–76 (discussing the suc-
cessful use of commitment techniques to alter behavior). 
 250. Stern, supra note 134, at 468 (discussing the success of such incen-
tives in inducing consumers to invest in their homes). 
 251. Id. (cautioning that such barriers can prevent acting on socially desir-
able behaviors). 
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time that they are looking to purchase a new water heater, and 
they must be aware of the incentive programs that could sub-
sidize the cost of this purchase. Similarly, the consumer also 
must believe that the TWH will deliver the promised cost sav-
ings. This requires a level of trust in the product label, the ven-
dor, and the individual who installs the product.252  
An incentive program that is marketed using established 
marketing principles253 will bring this product and incentive in-
formation to the consumer’s attention. Additional information 
that is provided at the time of purchase through product labels 
and well-educated intermediaries will ensure that the consum-
er has the appropriate information when the decision is made. 
The inclusion of reputable vendors, well-respected product 
manufacturers, and a guarantee of product efficiency will in-
crease levels of trust that the product will, in fact, achieve the 
advertised monetary outcomes.254 As consumers encounter 
more and more individuals in their social interactions who have 
used TWHs, levels of trust will also rise.255 Even when the in-
centive package is highly attractive to the consumer, trust in 
intermediaries and the program as well as product visibility 
are likely to be more important influences on the individual’s 
decision to purchase a TWH.256 An incentive program that ne-
glects these factors, therefore, may fail altogether or be no more 
successful than a program that offers a less attractive incen-
tive. 
b. The Extra-Rational Actor 
Because individuals are not fully rational in their consid-
eration of monetary outcomes,257 they are likely to act inappro-
priately on information relative to the minimization of costs. 
 
 252. Id. at 467–68 (noting that credibility can be an important factor in 
getting behavior to change). 
 253. This includes principles of product marketing as well as social market-
ing. For a detailed discussion of the utility of social marketing techniques, see 
MCKENZIE-MOHR & SMITH, supra note 6, at 82–92. 
 254. For a discussion of nonmonetary factors in encouraging participation 
on home efficiency incentive programs, including issues such as trust and credi-
bility, see Stern, supra note 134, at 467–68, and Stern et al., Effectiveness of 
Incentives, supra note 135, at 161–63. 
 255. See John M. Darley & James R. Beniger, Diffusion of Energy-
Conserving Innovations, 37 J. SOC. ISSUES 150, 159–66 (1981) (discussing the 
role of social networks in one’s decision to adopt certain technologies). 
 256. In fact, this is the case particularly when the incentive package is at-
tractive. See Stern et al., Effectiveness of Incentives, supra note 135, at 162. 
 257. Id. at 160. 
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Regulators using our framework would design information dis-
closure programs that recognize that an individual in the mar-
ket for a new water heater may underestimate the cost of oper-
ating it or fail to consider operating costs altogether.258 When 
information about operating costs is brought to their attention 
they are likely to discount those savings at a rate well above 
market value because individuals tend to assign greater value 
to immediate outcomes than to future outcomes.259 Because 
losses loom larger than gains in consumers’ minds, they may 
see greater value in avoiding a cost than achieving savings, 
even when the net value is identical.260 
Agencies should not rely on consumers to process and syn-
thesize information accurately. Well-designed labels that in-
clude information about operating costs and returns on invest-
ment will provide necessary information to assist consumers in 
making decisions to maximize monetary outcomes. If the deci-
sion to purchase a hot water heater is framed as an opportunity 
to avoid future losses rather than to achieve future gains, the 
individual is likely to be more compelled to make the invest-
ment.261 In short, the design of a label is less a matter of engi-
neering than of behavioral science. 
Agencies also should consider that consumers may assign 
cognitive costs a much greater value than the estimated mone-
tary value of those costs.262 If the incentive program is easy to 
use, the consumer is more likely to use it. Once the consumer is 
made aware of the existence of an incentive to purchase a 
TWH, the ease or difficulty of participating in that program 
will play a surprisingly large role.263 Consumers may be turned 
off if they do not know where to go to find out the details of the 
program, if they cannot easily determine their eligibility, if 
 
 258. See Stern, supra note 46, at 208–09 (discussing “anomalous” implica-
tions of consumer adoption decisions and offering possible explanations for 
such decisions). 
 259. See Feiler & Soll, supra note 127, at 289 (concluding that consumers 
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 260. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 63, at 456. 
 261. See Paul C. Stern, Psychological Dimensions of Global Environmental 
Change, 43 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 269, 291 (1992) (citing S. Yates, Using Prospect 
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there is a large paperwork burden involved in participating, or 
if they do not know where to go to purchase the product and 
how to have it installed.264 For these reasons, programs that 
are simple and that regulators communicate in clear, concise, 
and easy to understand language will be more successful. A 
program interface that offers this information as well as ac-
companying information about vendors that sell TWHs and in-
stall them will encourage greater participation. Finally, a pro-
gram that places the administrative burden on the vendor and 
requires minimal effort of the consumer will attract more par-
ticipants.265 Regulators may find that these efforts to reduce 
cognitive costs will make their program more vulnerable to 
abuse; however, this drawback is likely to be outweighed by the 
increased participation in the program. In short, cognitive costs 
may not appear in models that examine monetary costs, but 
they may be equally important to a regulatory program’s suc-
cess. 
2. Social Outcomes 
a. The Rational Actor 
Because individuals seek to maximize social outcomes, fac-
tors other than direct monetary outcomes will have important 
influences on their decisions. Individuals value social inclusion 
and seek approval from significant others in their social envi-
ronment.266 Behaviors that exemplify the principles held by 
those individuals and groups reap social rewards that have 
great value in the calculation of expected costs and benefits.267 
For example, an individual who identifies as an environmental-
ist and associates with other environmentalists may gain sta-
tus within his or her group by purchasing a hybrid vehicle, 
which has great symbolic significance but may not necessarily 
be economically cost-effective. For this reason, an individual 
 
 264. See, e.g., id. (noting the importance of low cognitive costs for effective 
household energy efficiency programs). 
 265. Cf. id. (indicating that the less consumers have to do to effectuate a 
program, the more likely it will be successful). 
 266. For work on social identity theory, see Henry Tajfel & John Turner, 
An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF 
INTERGROUP RELATIONS 33, 40–47 (William G. Austin & Stephen Worchel 
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 267. See, e.g., JOHN C. TURNER, SOCIAL INFLUENCE 163 (1991) (noting that 
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may be more likely to purchase a TWH if it is considered rele-
vant to the principles valued by an important social group. In-
formation that connects water heater purchases, or appliance 
purchases in general, to a social identity may trigger individu-
als to consider the social costs and benefits of that decision in 
the same way that many consider the decision to purchase a fur 
coat to be a faux pas.268 
Even when the individual is not motivated by the symbolic 
significance of an action, the desire to fit in with a group or to 
avoid negative social attention is known to be a powerful pre-
dictor of behavior. For this reason, individuals will take steps 
to fit in with those around them even when it may be inconven-
ient or carries an economic cost.269 By communicating informa-
tion to suggest that a behavior such as a TWH purchase is 
widespread or is becoming widespread (i.e., a descriptive norm), 
agency officials can signal to consumers that not adopting an 
action will be seen as out of the norm. Similarly, by communi-
cating to consumers that certain behavior is disapproved of or 
approved of (i.e., an injunctive norm), regulators can signal to 
consumers that a behavior carries with it social costs and bene-
fits.270 Information provided through education campaigns or 
intermediaries can communicate social norms in potentially 
powerful ways.  
Regulators who ignore the social costs and benefits of a be-
havior may cause counterproductive effects. As with electric car 
recharging at off-peak periods, marketing a hot water heater 
purchase as an economic decision without addressing its social 
significance may inadvertently crowd out nonmonetary motives 
for that decision for many individuals. Framing a decision that 
was once based on social outcome maximization as one that is 
based on monetary outcome maximization can trigger the con-
sumer to consider a different set of costs and benefits that may 
not produce the socially optimal outcome.271 In addition, energy 
 
 268. See id. (noting that identification with an ingroup makes it more likely 
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 269. See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. 
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savings realized from efficiency may be taken back if the con-
sumer uses the monetary savings from use of a TWH on other 
energy expenditures. Similarly, individuals who have adopted a 
TWH may be less motivated to conserve water, and therefore 
increase their shower time and hot water usage. These take-
back effects may be reduced by establishing goals and provid-
ing energy-use feedback to that individual.272 Likewise, provid-
ing comparative feedback that contrasts a household’s energy 
use with other efficient households may increase motivation to 
curtail energy use even after new technologies have been 
adopted.  
b. The Extra-Rational Actor 
Just as there is evidence that individuals behave extra-
rationally in their consideration of economic costs and benefits, 
extra-rational patterns also exist with respect to the goal of so-
cial outcome maximization.273 Individuals may act to maximize 
social outcomes even when they do not directly experience the 
payoffs. This may occur when behavior cannot be observed by 
others.274 For this reason, the social status one would gain by 
purchasing a TWH may operate even when an individual’s 
peers may not know about this purchase. Emphasizing the so-
cial costs and rewards associated with a behavior may have 
benefits even when that person does not perform a behavior in 
the public eye.275 
Individuals also may respond to a social norm that they do 
not necessarily endorse due to pluralistic ignorance.276 Al-
though this may not be directly related to appliance purchases, 
it may be highly relevant in other contexts such as decisions 
regarding lawn care or the purchase of used goods. Individuals 
may incorrectly believe that their peers would look down on 
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them for choosing not to use pesticides, for purchasing a used 
product, or for choosing a product based on its efficiency rather 
than its appearance.277 Information to overcome normative 
misperceptions can send more accurate social signals about 
what others consider acceptable or desirable behavior. 
Similarly, an individual may adopt personal norms even 
outside of the context of a group to reward or punish that be-
havior. Personal norms may be based on broader societal val-
ues such as fairness, patriotism, or environmental protection. 
Individuals may choose to internalize these values as personal 
norms as a function of their own disposition or personal expe-
riences. Individuals are often motivated to act consistently with 
a personal norm out of a desire for consistency or to reduce the 
cognitive dissonance that results from behaving inconsistently 
with a personal norm or belief.278 A public education campaign 
that makes widely held personal values or norms salient (i.e., 
energy security or environmental protection) can trigger dis-
sonance-reducing behavior and encourage efficient invest-
ments.279 For example, a campaign that connects TWH and 
other appliance selections to environmental outcomes or energy 
security may motivate individuals to invest in this product 
when it is time to replace an old appliance. Furthermore, if this 
message is present at the time of decisionmaking (when the in-
dividual is purchasing the appliance), it is likely to be most 
successful. Requesting a commitment to purchase a more effi-
cient water heater or other appliance the next time the individ-
ual is eligible can also prevent individuals from rationalizing or 
explaining away their decision to act inconsistently with a per-
sonal norm.280 Regulators may need to conduct these initiatives 
in a more community-based approach, and the difficulties of 
coordination may be outweighed by increased levels of success.  
  CONCLUSION   
The framework that we present continues the process of 
transforming behavioral insights into concrete considerations, 
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thereby enabling agencies to improve the efficacy and efficiency 
of regulation. It also will discourage agencies from allowing ad 
hoc considerations to reduce the rationality of regulation. More 
broadly, our framework will facilitate judicial review of regula-
tion, which is an important corrective for arbitrary agency ac-
tion. In addition, it will enhance presidential and congressional 
oversight, improving the political accountability of regulation. 
Our framework also will enable interested parties to evaluate 
the effect of behaviorally informed regulatory analysis on regu-
lation across government and will spur further study to im-
prove that analysis, filling gaps in our understanding of behav-
ioral responses. 
In some senses, our framework is both too complicated and 
not complicated enough. It is more complicated than the exist-
ing model of regulatory analysis, but that result is inevitable 
once we acknowledge the importance of behavioral insights to 
effective regulation. At the same time, it does not provide a 
model that will generate quantitative results or a comprehen-
sive set of instructions on how to incorporate behavioral in-
sights. The field is still developing and further theoretical and 
applied research will need to be done. In fact, we may need a 
new cross-discipline of social behavioral psychology. We also 
may need sociologists and social psychologists to sit alongside 
the economists within agencies and OIRA.281 In the meantime, 
our framework is likely to improve the success of regulations 
aimed at individual and household behavior—which is to say 
much of the regulation that agencies contemplate in the regula-
tory state. 
Likewise, our examples from the energy-use context are 
not conclusive. For example, sufficient holes remain in our un-
derstanding of behavioral plasticity to warrant policies to tar-
get a host of behaviors. Individuals may be unwilling to modify 
some behaviors for unanticipated reasons while others may be 
more flexible. Thus, continued research and evaluation will de-
velop our understanding of where the most cost-effective oppor-
tunities exist for agency officials to develop policies that hone in 
on the most promising opportunities for emissions reductions in 
the future. The limitations on the available data are not a bar 
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to progress in this area, but rather they suggest that the use of 
behavioral insights in regulatory development and review is at 
an early stage of development, just as was economic analysis of 
regulatory activity several decades ago. 
Entering the behavioral era means looking at regulation 
through a new lens. It reflects frank recognition that regulation 
cannot work effectively or efficiently if it does not consider how 
targeted populations respond. Cost-benefit analysis has devel-
oped through practical application and theoretical considera-
tion, and we now know much more about the rational-actor 
model on which it is based. We expect the same for behavioral 
insights. By providing a framework for incorporating such in-
sights into regulatory analysis, we aim to take a critical step in 
that direction. 
